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I. INTRODUCTION
SOME people who have severe mental illnesses or other severe mentaldisabilities derive benefit from the care and treatment provided in psy-
chiatric hospitals and other inpatient settings.1  Frequently, the very disa-
bilities that call for inpatient treatment also disrupt an individual patient’s
capacity to participate fully in the decision-making process by which hospi-
tal admission is elected.2  All jurisdictions within the United States main-
tain statutory schemes that allocate decision-making authority with respect
to psychiatric hospital admissions, often by creating separate procedures
and standards for “voluntary” admissions and involuntary commitments.3
A number of states have adopted a preference for voluntary hospitaliza-
tion over involuntary civil commitment, in part based on the theory that
voluntary psychiatric patients are more likely to form a therapeutic alli-
ance with clinicians and are therefore better able to benefit from treat-
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1. See THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSY-
CHIATRY AND THE LAW 73 (1982) (stating that inpatient care “provide[s] structure, a
supportive milieu, protection, intensive care, closely supervised pharmacotherapy,
electroconvulsive therapy, or other forms of treatment”).  As used throughout this
Article, the phrase “mental disability” includes mental illnesses; significant devel-
opmental disabilities (particularly intellectual disabilities); and the impairments
associated with geriatric dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, and the like.
2. See generally Lisa Grossman & Frank Summers, A Study of the Capacity of Schiz-
ophrenic Patients to Give Informed Consent, 31 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 205 (1980);
Robert P. Roca, Determining Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1177 (1994).
3. See generally SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
21–189 (3d ed. 1985); GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 39–51; CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, ARTI RAI & RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 700–867 (5th ed. 2008).
(1)
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ment.4  Not all states, however, provide clear statutory or judicial
guidelines on the degree of capacity required for a patient to consent to
admission.5
Determining whether (and how) patients with impaired decision-
making capacity may consent to inpatient treatment is a complex question
that often turns on an interpretation of state laws read against the back-
drop of constitutional doctrine governing the due process rights of indi-
vidual patients.6  In addition, in some cases, impaired patients have court-
appointed guardians who are authorized to make financial decisions,
treatment decisions, or both, for their wards.7  In instances in which
guardians have received either general authorization to make decisions
for their wards or have been granted specific authority to make health-
care decisions, difficult legal questions may arise as to the power of the
guardian to consent to the ward’s admission for inpatient psychiatric treat-
ment.8  In a number of states, the law is clear that a guardian may not
consent to the ward’s admission to a psychiatric hospital, thus requiring
the use of the state’s involuntary civil commitment process in order to
obtain inpatient treatment.9  In other states, it is clear that a guardian may
provide the necessary consent for voluntary admission.10  In a third group
of states, the guardian may consent so long as the ward also consents or, in
some jurisdictions, does not object.11  In a fourth group of states, the
4. See Karna Halverson, Voluntary Admission and Treatment of Incompetent Persons
with a Mental Illness, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 161, 164–66 (2005); Donald H.
Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric Hospitalization: Myth or Reality?, 9
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 26–28 (1999).  Voluntary hospitalization is also favored by
many clinicians, policy makers, and academics because it is said to be less adminis-
tratively burdensome, less stigmatizing, and better aligned with the value of patient
autonomy than involuntary commitment. See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent
to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch,
14 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 169, 192–99 (1991).
5. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 50.
6. The leading United States Supreme Court decisions on the due process
rights of voluntary patients are Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (suggesting,
in dicta, constitutional requirement for preadmission determination of compe-
tency of voluntary patient), and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (recognizing
authority of parents or guardians seeking to arrange minor’s voluntary
hospitalization).
7. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 221–23. See generally Lawrence
A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23
ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1981).
8. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 377; GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1,
at 36.
9. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150(e) (2012) (prohibiting guardians from
placing wards in psychiatric facilities: “A guardian may not [ ] place the ward in a
facility or institution for the mentally ill other than through a formal commitment
proceeding under [Alaska Stat. §] 47.30 in which the ward has a separate guardian
ad litem”).
10. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-20 (2012) (authorizing guardians to make
applications for wards’ voluntary commitment).
11. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1415 (West 2014) (“[A]n individ-
ual 18 years of age or over may be hospitalized as a formal voluntary patient if the
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guardian’s authority to arrange for voluntary inpatient care depends on
the guardian obtaining specific court authorization, although the substan-
tive standards and procedural requirements for securing such an order
may differ from those that govern involuntary commitment.12  Finally, a
range of additional variations exists in other states, often created by the
interplay between the laws regulating mental hospital admission and other
provisions governing the powers and responsibilities of guardians.13
Several rationales have been provided for the statutory or case law
rules operating in a number of states to prohibit guardians from con-
senting to a ward’s psychiatric hospitalization, or withholding that author-
ity when the ward objects.  One widely cited state court has reasoned:
If we were not to require at least substantial compliance with the
[involuntary commitment] law to fully protect the rights of in-
competents it would be possible for an unscrupulous person to
have himself appointed as guardian and then lock his ward in a
mental institution and proceed to waste the ward’s estate.14
It is worth comparing this skepticism about the good faith of an ap-
pointed guardian of an adult with the presumed good faith of parents who
seek the “voluntary” hospitalization of a child against the child’s wishes,
which was central to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Parham v. J.R.15  In Parham, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court’s
majority, made plain that an independent medical assessment by hospital
individual executes an application for hospitalization as a formal voluntary patient
or the individual assents and the full guardian of the individual, the limited guard-
ian with authority to admit, or a patient advocate authorized by the individual to
make mental health treatment decisions under the estates and protected individu-
als code, 1998 [Mich. Pub. Acts] 386, [Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§] 700.1101 to
700.8102, executes an application for hospitalization and if the hospital director
considers the individual to be clinically suitable for that form of hospitalization.”).
12. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312.01 (2012) (providing that guardi-
ans must obtain court order and comply with other notice requirements and pro-
cedural provisions before placing wards in inpatient mental health settings).
13. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-312(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (“[A] guard-
ian may consent or withhold consent that may be necessary to enable the incapaci-
tated person to receive or refuse medical or other professional care, counsel,
treatment or service.”).  However, guardians may only present their wards for eval-
uation for inpatient mental health treatment:
A guardian appointed under the Uniform Probate Code, an agent or sur-
rogate under the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act or an agent under
the Mental Health Care Treatment Decisions Act shall not consent to the
admission of an individual to a mental health care facility.  If a guardian
has full power or limited power that includes medical or mental health
treatment or, if the individual’s written advance health-care directive or
advance directive for mental health treatment expressly permits treat-
ment in a mental health care facility, the guardian, agent or surrogate
may present the person to a facility only for evaluation for admission . . . .
Id. § 43-1-14.
14. Von Luce v. Rankin, 588 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Ark. 1979) (in banc).
15. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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officials is a sufficient check against possible abuse by parents whose mo-
tives for seeking inpatient care may be at odds with their child’s best inter-
ests.16  Some writers have suggested that a similar process of medical
review should suffice to ameliorate the concerns about abuse by the guard-
ians of adult wards that animate the restrictive rules operating in a num-
ber of states.17  Other writers have suggested that state law limitations on
the authority of guardians to approve voluntary hospitalization for incom-
petent adults stem from a concern that permitting such authority would
provide a built-in end-run around these jurisdictions’ involuntary commit-
ment criteria and procedures, including their rigorous standard of
proof.18
Since the 1970s, the laws governing involuntary civil commitment in
virtually every state have required a finding that an individual subject to
commitment must not only be mentally disabled but also dangerous to
himself or herself or others.19  Voluntary hospitalization, by contrast, gen-
erally is based on the patient’s need for and amenability to treatment.20
Significantly, the development of more demanding civil commitment stan-
dards in the 1970s represented a move away from the mid-century ap-
proach of permitting involuntary hospitalizations on a medical-needs
basis, in which the decision maker often was a board of physicians rather
than a judge or jury.21  If a guardian is not permitted to consent to volun-
tary admission, however, the more restrictive involuntary commitment
standard—with its dangerousness criterion in particular—may make it dif-
ficult or impossible to arrange for inpatient care for some patients with
severe mental disabilities who do not present a risk of harm to themselves
or others, but who would benefit from such treatment.22
There are other important consequences as well that may flow from
the requirement that a patient under guardianship be civilly committed
rather than voluntarily hospitalized, including possible differences in the
rules governing the provision of psychotropic medications, discharge,
16. See id. at 607.  While Chief Justice Burger’s rationale—that the law gener-
ally presumes the good faith of parents because of their natural love and affection
for their children—would appear to be a sufficient basis to distinguish the court-
appointed guardians of adult wards, the Parham decision also included minor
wards hospitalized by a state department of social services. See id. at 587–88.
17. See Halverson, supra note 4, at 167.
18. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 864; Stone, supra note 4, at
42; see also In re Gardner, 459 N.E.2d 17, 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that
placement by guardian under voluntary admission statute without ward’s consent
is precluded because “grant of such power would contravene the involuntary com-
mitment provisions” of state law).
19. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 40; SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER,
supra note 3, at 705.
20. See Stone, supra note 4, at 30–32.
21. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 40; SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER,
supra note 3, at 703.
22. See Stone, supra note 4, at 37.
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length of stay, and the like.23  The question, then, is whether a set of legal
standards and practices either exists or can be developed that would pro-
vide for the treatment needs of those patients who have an impaired ca-
pacity to consent to voluntary hospitalization but who do not meet the
criteria for involuntary civil commitment.  Such an approach should be
attentive to (and seek to minimize) the potential for coercion or abuse
these patients may face and should be designed to maximize the self-deter-
mination of which they are capable.  Some patients whose disabilities are
chronic but episodic may be able to provide adequate consent through
the use of advance directives, although the use of such instruments—espe-
cially by persons with mental disabilities—is relatively rare.24  Others may
be able to participate in the decision-making process if the criteria by
which their competence is assessed are defined to require only minimal
functionality.25  But patients who are assisted by third-party decision mak-
ers—particularly those with court-appointed guardians—should be able to
gain access to inpatient psychiatric treatment without running the gaunt-
let of involuntary civil commitment, if the substantive standards and proce-
dural requirements put in place by state law can be made adequate to
insure that the third-party decision makers are acting with respect for the
values held by these patients and, to the extent possible, are seeking to
serve their best interests.
Part II of this Article recounts the long history of the development of
involuntary civil commitment law and practice in the United States and
the more recent development of voluntary inpatient admissions.  It also
explores the role that informed consent plays in voluntary hospitalizations
and the due process considerations regarding consent introduced into
23. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH—GEN. § 10-708(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2013)
(providing right to refuse medication); id. § 10-803 (providing for release of volun-
tary patient).
24. See generally Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care—A
Case for Greater Use, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889 (1991); Ardath A. Hamann, Family
Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38
VILL. L. REV. 103, 125–34 (1993).  In the context of persons with mental illness, see
Halverson, supra note 4, at 182; Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for
Those with Mental Illness, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 57 (1996); cf. Rebecca S. Dresser,
Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the Voluntary Commitment
Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 777 (1982) (describing and criticizing “volun-
tary commitment contracts” by which chronically mentally ill persons could com-
mit to consent to future inpatient treatment when their illness would prevent their
providing voluntary consent).
25. See Francine Cournos et al., Report of the Task Force on Consent to Voluntary
Hospitalization, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 293, 298–300 (1993); Rael Jean
Isaac & Samuel Jan Brakel, Subverting Good Intentions: A Brief History of Mental Health
Law “Reform”, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 115–16 (1992) (describing APA
Task Force’s recommended “easy-to-meet” standard for consent, under which “pa-
tient expressing agreement with admission and treatment in any way, verbal, be-
havioral or written, and displaying some minimal understanding of where he is
and why, would meet the competency requirements for admission and initial
treatment”).
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this area by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Zinermon v.
Burch.26  Part III takes up the topic of guardianships and the related ques-
tion of how incompetency—the threshold requirement for the appoint-
ment of a guardian—is defined.  Part IV reviews the variety of approaches
adopted by states for regulating the authority of guardians to provide con-
sent for inpatient treatment.  Part IV then concludes with an analysis of
the interests in tension and offers a framework for an effective statutory
approach to the area.
II. VOLUNTARY INPATIENT ADMISSION, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT,
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT
The practice of permitting the voluntary psychiatric hospital admis-
sion of persons with mental disabilities did not become widespread in the
United States until the last quarter of the twentieth century.27  While the
first state law governing voluntary admissions was enacted in Massachusetts
in 1881, and while over half of the states had statutes regulating the prac-
tice by 1924, few patients with mental disabilities were admitted as inpa-
tients on their own initiative.28  Even as late as the decades following
World War II, only about 10% of psychiatric inpatients were voluntarily
admitted.29  In the 1970s, however, the practice became much more com-
mon, accounting for a majority of mental hospital admissions in many
jurisdictions.30
Today, voluntary admission laws are in force in virtually every state,
and voluntary patients make up more than 50% of the population in spe-
cialized mental hospitals and about 85% of the population in psychiatric
units of general hospitals.31  The law in a number of states sets out a pref-
erence for voluntary hospitalization over involuntary civil commitment,32
and “almost all mental health professionals, and probably a majority of the
mental health bar, favor the retention of voluntary admissions as the most
frequently used means of ingress to a psychiatric hospital.”33
26. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
27. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 48.
28. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 177–78.
29. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 48.
30. See id.
31. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 857.
32. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 178; Stone, supra note 4, at 29 (describ-
ing statutory preference for voluntary admission in Minnesota, New York, Louisi-
ana, and Florida).
33. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 49.  The modern trend has been
for states to enact parallel statutes governing the voluntary admission of develop-
mentally disabled persons and individuals with substance use disorders as well as
patients with mental illness.  In some states,
[T]he “voluntary” admission procedures for developmentally disabled
persons are not so much identical as analogous to those for the mentally
ill.  These procedures are sometimes labeled “administrative,” permitting
the developmentally disabled person to apply for himself if he is of age
and competent but providing for application by the parent or guardian
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This increase in the rate of voluntary admissions for persons with
mental disabilities has taken place within the context of a public mental
health system in the United States that has been focused, for most of the
past two centuries, primarily on involuntary commitment.34  In order to
frame further consideration of voluntary admissions for persons under
guardianship, therefore, attention to the course of development of invol-
untary commitment law and practice in the United States is due.
A. The Development of Civil Commitment Law and Practice
The first civil commitment statutes were enacted in American states in
the late eighteenth century.35  By the middle of the nineteenth century,
the practice of civil commitment had become somewhat common, in part
due to a growing perception—fostered by the founding of the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) and the advocacy of Benjamin Rush and
others—that effective “scientific” techniques for treating mentally ill per-
sons were available.36
The ensuing path of this history of involuntary treatment for persons
with mental disabilities is anything but linear.  A number of commentators
have described the historical record as “cyclical” or marked by the swing-
ing of a “pendulum” between the poles of paternalist concern for those
with mental illness and other mental disabilities on the one side, and an
opposing libertarian pole animated by fears of government (and physi-
cian) overreaching and centered on the values of individual autonomy
and self-determination on the other.37  The libertarian impulse was first
expressed in the period immediately following the Civil War, when pa-
tients’ rights advocates raised concerns that some idiosyncratic individuals
were being unnecessarily targeted for involuntary commitment by others
who found their religious beliefs or political opinions to be excessively
“novel.”38  Particularly troubling stories also emerged about malevolent
husbands who arranged to have their wives committed for reasons of sim-
ple convenience.39  During the 1860s and early 1870s, these crusaders per-
suaded a number of states to enact procedural protections in the civil
commitment context that included a right to counsel and trial by jury.40
when he is not, in which case the procedure is—by our definition—not
voluntary.
BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 179.
34. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 701–09.
35. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 14.
36. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 702.
37. See id. at 701–04. See generally ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES (2d ed.
1949).
38. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 703.
39. See, e.g., BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 15 (describing involuntary commit-
ment of Mrs. E.P.W. Packard in Illinois by petition of her husband and her subse-
quent campaign to reform mental health law).
40. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 703.
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The pendulum swung back in the direction of paternalist interven-
tionism during the Progressive Era of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries.  Reformers, influenced by Dorothea Dix and others who
had worked tirelessly to expand the resources available for the mentally
disabled, showed a renewed interest in providing care and treatment for
persons with mental illness, which in turn led to an increased “medicaliza-
tion” of procedures for their civil commitment.41  These efforts gained
momentum following World War II, as new treatment technologies—in-
cluding modern psychotherapy, psychosurgery, electro-convulsive therapy,
and early pharmacotherapies—became available.42  In the period between
the 1940s and the early 1970s, consistent with this increasingly medicalized
approach, hearings before juries or judicial officers were replaced in many
jurisdictions by “lunacy commissions” or physicians’ boards, and danger-
ousness criteria disappeared in favor of “in need of treatment” standards
for involuntary admission.43  More voluntary admission statutes also began
to appear during this period.44
Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the pendulum swung
once more, this time in a libertarian direction.  In addition, for the first
time, a significant percentage of patients with mental disabilities were vol-
untarily admitted for inpatient treatment.45  Influenced by the civil rights
movement and by a broad rethinking by both policymakers and the lay
public of the mid-century commitment to a paternalistic “rehabilitative
ideal,”46 the libertarian reforms of the 1970s produced widespread statu-
tory revisions that refocused civil commitment criteria on dangerousness,
as opposed to amenability to or need for treatment, and reintroduced le-
galized procedural protections such as a right to counsel, heightened bur-
dens of proof, and the like.47
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 40.
44. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 177–78.
45. See id. at 178.
46. For a classic account of the rise and fall of rehabilitative practice and the-
ory in the twentieth century, see FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILI-
TATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981). See also Richard C. Boldt,
Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q.
1205, 1218–45 (1998).
47. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 703–04.  Perhaps the most
influential state statutory reform of this period was the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act,
passed by the California legislature in 1967. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000
(1981).  The California law, which served as a model for statutory revisions in a
number of other states, “made dangerousness to self or others the core criteria for
commitment, defined these criteria relatively narrowly, and provided extensive
procedural protections.” SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 704.  State leg-
islative reform was supported in a number of jurisdictions by state court and lower
federal court decisions, articulating the beginnings of a constitutional jurispru-
dence based on the due process clause. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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The libertarian individual rights reforms of the 1970s combined with
a dramatic increase in the use of psychotropic medications—which were
first introduced in the 1950s—fueled a process of “deinstitutionalization”
that reduced the census of public and private psychiatric hospitals
throughout the final decades of the twentieth century.48  Thus, while
more than 550,000 patients were in public mental hospitals on any given
day in the mid-1950s, that number had dropped to roughly 130,000 pa-
tients by the mid-1980s.49  Contained within this declining population of
inpatients receiving care and treatment for mental illness, however, was a
steadily increasing percentage of voluntary patients.  As the parens patriae
rationale for hospital admission largely was excised from the laws and poli-
cies governing involuntary commitment,50 and as involuntary confine-
ment essentially became limited to the dangerous mentally ill, it was only
natural that clinicians, concerned family members, and others increasingly
would come to rely on voluntary admissions as a means of providing access
to inpatient services for patients with significant mental disabilities who
did not present an imminent threat to themselves or to others.  In addi-
tion, the underlying values of patient autonomy and self-determination
that animated much of the effort toward civil commitment reform were
consistent with a new emphasis on voluntary hospitalization that was said
to enlist the patient in decision making about his or her own care, and
that, at least superficially, permitted the patient to retain some control
over the nature and duration of his or her hospitalization.51
B. Voluntary Inpatient Admission: Coercion and Choice
In truth, while the restrictions imposed on involuntary commitment
standards and the increased legalization of commitment procedures, on
48. This process of deinstitutionalization was linked with the community
treatment movement, which had led to the passage of the Community Mental
Health Centers Act by Congress in 1963.  The idea behind the community treat-
ment movement was that many persons with mental disabilities could be treated
effectively with psychotropic medications and other services as outpatients in a net-
work of new community mental health centers (CMHCs) that were supposed to be
constructed and staffed, in part, through new federal government resources.
While a number of CMHCs were built, the full network of facilities was never com-
pleted and the level of staffing and services envisioned never fully supported and
never achieved. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 706.  A number of
commentators critical of deinstitutionalization place special emphasis on the fail-
ure of the community treatment movement in their accounts of this failed policy.
See, e.g., Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental
Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 143
(2003); see also Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior:
Possible Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 101
(1972).
49. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 47.
50. See id. at 24; GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 39–40.
51. See Stone, supra note 4, at 27 (explaining that voluntary admission “re-
spects individual autonomy” and “allows the patient the legal right to request
release”).
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the one hand, and the growth of voluntary admissions, on the other, were
interconnected phenomena; the relationship between involuntary and vol-
untary admission was, and is, exceedingly complex.  The simple notion
that most voluntary patients act relatively free from coercion when they
elect to enter the hospital, and the paired idea that involuntarily commit-
ted patients generally express a “knowing, overt resistance” to their admis-
sion, are both overstated.52  As Brakel points out, “[i]n the vast majority of
involuntary and voluntary cases, it is the family or relatives who move to-
ward, pressure for, or insist on commitment.”53  As a consequence, he re-
ports, “[i]n many instances where it orders commitment, the state’s
judicial machinery merely formalizes and sanctions a decision arrived at by
the family and the family doctor.”54  At the same time, he explains, “[t]he
phenomenon of a freely derived, fully conscious, voluntary decision to
enter a mental facility (particularly a public facility) is as rare as knowing,
overt resistance to involuntary commitment.”55  This is so, because in
many cases, voluntary patients are “already in some form of official cus-
tody” when they “elect” hospitalization, and their choice in that respect is
often made with “the threat of involuntary commitment as the principal
means of persuasion.”56
It is, perhaps, because of the coercive features present within many
voluntary mental hospital admissions that state law generally imposes re-
strictions on the practice that are not ordinarily present in the case of
voluntary hospital admissions for other health-care services.  State laws typ-
ically contain detailed provisions setting out the process by which an indi-
vidual may elect to enter an inpatient mental health treatment facility, the
criteria under which that application for admission is to be assessed by
hospital personnel, and the rights and restrictions (particularly on re-
questing discharge from the hospital) that apply once the voluntary pa-
52. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 32.
53. Id.
54. Id. Of course, this account assumes that the patient has an engaged fam-
ily or support group and is being cared for by a family physician.  Increasingly in
recent years, however, many severely mentally ill patients come into (or re-enter)
the public mental health system as homeless or nearly homeless individuals, often
alienated from family and friends and without ongoing links to health care or
other social service providers.  In such cases, the patient is just as likely to come
into the treatment system by way of the criminal justice system as through the
efforts of family and friends. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 48, at 143.
55. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 32.
56. Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, “Voluntary” Hospitalization of the Men-
tally Ill, 66 NW. U. L. REV. 429, 430 (1971); see also Stone, supra note 4, at 36 (“Indi-
viduals are taken from their home community and escorted through the door of
the psychiatric facility accompanied by police, family members, or other interested
individuals seeking inpatient psychiatric care and treatment for the patients.  At
that time, patients may be asked to avoid involuntary commitment and accept
treatment on a voluntary basis.  Hospital staff and other interested individuals may
promise a quicker release date, a less adversarial posture, and general sentiments
that this is best for all concerned.”).
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tient is admitted.57  Even the designation of an admission as “voluntary”
oversimplifies the variety of ways in which a patient can enter an inpatient
psychiatric facility without going through the involuntary commitment
process.  Thus, in some states, a voluntary admission can result either from
the applications of patients themselves, or from the application of a desig-
nated third-party decision maker, such as a court-appointed guardian or
an individual authorized by a properly executed advanced directive.58
Moreover, in most states, the governing statutes distinguish between
“pure” voluntary admissions, a status that permits the patient to leave the
hospital whenever he or she wishes, and “conditional” voluntary admission
(sometimes also referred to as “formal” admission), under which the pa-
tient is prohibited from leaving prior to the passage of a period of time
(usually several days) after providing notice to hospital officials of an in-
tention to leave.59
C. The Zinermon Decision and the Problem of Informed Consent
However conceived, the notion of voluntarily seeking admission for
inpatient treatment in a psychiatric facility fairly implies that the patient
has exercised some sort of choice.  In the case of other health-care ser-
vices, including general medical inpatient treatment, patients must pro-
vide informed consent.60  The laws in some states governing voluntary
admission into mental hospitals and other psychiatric inpatient settings
reflect this general principle and require that informed consent be ob-
tained before a patient can be admitted.61  In many other states, however,
no explicit consent requirements are set out in the governing statutes.62
This patchwork of differing state law standards for consent also character-
ized the state of the law in 1990 and formed the background for the
57. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 177.
58. Brakel takes the position that admissions accomplished at the request of a
third-party decision maker should not be labeled as “voluntary,” but that terminol-
ogy does appear in other descriptions of the practice. See id.
59. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 49.
60. The requirement of informed consent for medical treatment is often
traced to Justice (then Judge) Benjamin Cardozo’s opinion in Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), where the court stated: “Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” Id. See
generally A.D. Nieuw, Informed Consent, 12 MED. & L. 125 (1993).
61. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-400 (2014) (setting out consent require-
ment for voluntary admission in Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabil-
ities Code); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.17 (McKinney 2014) (governing
requirement of informed consent); see also In re Gardner, 459 N.E.2d 17, 20 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (holding that individual who lacked capacity to provide informed
consent for inpatient treatment could not be admitted by his guardian).
62. For a general discussion of the state statutes governing voluntary hospitali-
zation, see infra notes 142–235 and accompanying text.
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United States Supreme Court’s discussion of voluntary psychiatric admis-
sion in its decision in Zinermon v. Burch.63
In Zinermon, the Court’s primary focus was on a technical question
concerning whether a federal civil rights claim for damages under § 1983
could be brought against hospital officials who had treated the plaintiff as
a voluntary patient, notwithstanding his disoriented psychotic condition
upon admission.  The underlying events had taken place in Florida, one of
a minority of states whose law did (and still does) require that voluntary
patients provide competent informed consent for admission.64  The nar-
row question addressed by the Justices was whether, given this statutory
requirement, the patient Burch was entitled as a matter of federal due
process to be screened for competency before being admitted as a volun-
tary patient.  Given that he was “hallucinating” and believed he was “in
heaven,” and thus, by all accounts, was not able to provide competent in-
formed consent,65 Burch’s argument was that his admission should have
been sought through Florida’s involuntary civil commitment process.
That process would have provided him with an adversarial hearing, a right
to counsel, and all of the other procedural safeguards associated with the
legalized approach to commitment that had become the norm through-
out the United States by 1990.66  Under then-existing § 1983 law, this nar-
row question turned on whether Florida’s requirement of informed
consent had been foreseeably and routinely violated in practice, and
whether a post-deprivation remedy could be made available or whether a
pre-deprivation determination of competency was necessary to protect the
underlying state-law-based liberty interest.67
Writing for a five-person majority, Justice Blackmun held that “[i]t is
hardly unforeseeable that a person requesting treatment for mental illness
might be incapable of informed consent, and that state officials with the
power to admit patients might take their apparent willingness to be admit-
ted at face value and not initiate involuntary placement procedures.”68
Therefore, he explained, Burch and other patients like him were entitled
to some screening for competence before being voluntarily admitted as
63. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
64. At the time Zinermon was decided, the Florida statute required that a pa-
tient voluntarily give “‘express and informed consent to evaluation or treatment,’”
or, in the alternative, that “a proceeding for court-ordered evaluation or involun-
tary placement [be] initiated.” See id. at 122 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.463(1)(d)
(1981)).  Currently, the statute requires: “The patient . . . shall be asked to give
express and informed consent to placement as a voluntary patient, and, if such
consent is given, the patient shall be admitted as a voluntary patient; or [ ] A peti-
tion for involuntary placement shall be filed . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 394.463(i)(3)–(4)
(2014).
65. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 118–19.
66. See id. at 124.
67. See Paul A. Nidich, Zinermon v. Burch and Voluntary Admissions to Public
Hospitals: A Common Sense Proposal for Compromise, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 699, 702–03
(1998); see also Winick, supra note 4, at 174–77.
68. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136.
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psychiatric inpatients.69  The majority did not detail what a constitution-
ally adequate preadmission procedure might look like, although the tenor
of Blackmun’s discussion suggests that a judicial hearing likely would not
be necessary and that a standardized assessment of competence by clini-
cians at the hospital might suffice.70
The broader question lurking in the case—which the Justices chose
not to resolve explicitly, given the procedural posture in which the matter
came to the Court—was whether all voluntary patients in state facilities
must provide some sort of informed consent and, if so, whether they there-
fore have a constitutional right to some preadmission process by which
their competence to provide that consent is evaluated.  Dicta in Justice
Blackmun’s opinion has led one commentator to conclude that the
Court’s view was that “all voluntary patients should be screened for compe-
tence before hospitalization.”71  This broader suggestion is grounded in
Blackmun’s discussion of the liberty interest held by psychiatric inpa-
tients.72  Perhaps, however, the majority’s suggestion—that a preadmis-
sion assessment of a patient’s capacity is required by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even in states without an explicit
statutory requirement of informed consent—was a function of the extent
of the deprivation in Burch’s case.  The majority opinion goes to some
lengths to catalogue the specific circumstances of Burch’s hospitalization,
including the fact that he remained in the state hospital for five months.
As Justice Blackmun put the point: “Burch’s confinement at [Florida State
Hospital] for five months without a hearing or any other procedure to
determine either that he validly had consented to admission, or that he
met the statutory standard for involuntary placement, clearly infringes on
[his] liberty interest.”73
In any event, in the period immediately following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Zinermon, its implied message, however inchoate, that
voluntary patients must be competent to consent to inpatient admission,
attracted the attention of key stakeholders in the field.  Most particularly,
it caught the attention of the APA, which promptly put in place a task
force to address the question.74  At the time, nearly three-quarters of all
inpatient psychiatric admissions in the United States were voluntary.75
69. See id.
70. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Voluntary Hospitalization and Due Process: The Di-
lemma of Zinermon v. Burch, 41 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 1059, 1060 (1990).
71. See id.
72. One writer has referred to this as the “‘hidden agenda’ of the majority”
opinion in Zinermon.  Nidich, supra note 67, at 704.  This reading of the case, he
suggests, “as requiring informed consent before a state hospital can accept a re-
quest for voluntary admission is certainly on the minds of those involved in this
process.” Id.
73. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 131.
74. See Stone, supra note 4, at 42.
75. See Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 1060; see also SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER,
supra note 3, at 857.
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR101.txt unknown Seq: 14  9-MAR-15 10:26
14 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 1
Available research on the capacity of these patients to meet a rigorous
standard of informed consent indicated that the great majority of these
patients were incapable of understanding and rationally processing even
fairly basic information about inpatient psychiatric admission.76  If the al-
ternative route of involuntary civil commitment were to become the pri-
mary means by which inpatient psychiatric admissions were achieved,
massive new adjudicative resources would be required.  In their absence,
the courts, lawyers, and administrative personnel available to operate a
vastly expanded civil commitment system would be overwhelmed.77  In ad-
dition, many of the former voluntary patients who now would have to be
involuntarily committed might be prevented from receiving inpatient
treatment because, while less than fully competent, they would not likely
be found imminently dangerous to themselves or to others.78
The Task Force, motivated by all of these considerations, concluded
that “strong policy interests support the establishment of a low threshold
for competence in this situation.”79  The “undemanding threshold” they
adopted was made up of two competencies, the ability to “communicat[e]
choices” and the ability to understand “that he/she is being admitted to a
psychiatric hospital or ward for treatment, and [ ] understand[ ] release
from the hospital may not be automatic . . . .”80  No additional require-
ments often associated with competency determinations—such as the abil-
ity to rationally weigh costs and benefits or to evaluate a decision free from
false beliefs—were included in the Task Force’s recommendations.81
Even this diminished set of requirements endorsed by the Task Force
might have been too demanding, had they been rigorously applied.  How-
ever, they have not been, at least not consistently.82  Given the circum-
stances, it is easy to see why this has been so.  In research conducted a few
years after the Task Force recommendations were issued, Norman
76. One widely cited study, for example, found that “60 percent of the sample
[of schizophrenic patients] consented to treatment even though only 15 percent
fully understood what they were consenting to . . . .”  Grossman & Summers, supra
note 2, at 206.  The authors concluded that their “results suggest that only a small
portion of schizophrenics may be able to give fully informed consent as required
by law,” and thus “there is a serious discrepancy between legal requirements and
the capacity of schizophrenic patients.” Id.
77. See Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 1060; see also GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM,
supra note 1, at 50–51.
78. See Stone, supra note 4, at 37.
79. Binyamin C. Appelbaum, Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Competence
to Consent to Voluntary Psychiatric Hospitalization: A Test of a Standard Proposed by APA,
49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1193, 1193 (1998).
80. Cournos et al., supra note 25, at 299–300.
81. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 216.
82. Although written before Zinermon was decided, the following remains an
apt description of ongoing practice: “Many clinicians are not aware of the right of
competent patients to refuse treatment and will inform them that they ‘must’ sign
themselves into the hospital.  Few therapists on the other hand will reject the
agreement of a patient to treatment, even if he is clearly incompetent.” GUTHEIL &
APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 37 (citation omitted).
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Poythress and his colleagues designed a study in which they distinguished
between “weak” and “strong” models of informed consent.  The question
they addressed was similar to that confronted by the Task Force: “how
stringent should the test of capacity be in screenings anticipated by the
Zinermon dicta?”83  Instead of focusing on the strong model of consent—
which was defined to include “fairly extensive disclosure” about the legal
rights waived by voluntary admission, the procedures for discharge, and
the “adverse social costs (e.g., stigma) potentially attendant to hospitaliza-
tion”—Poythress and colleagues measured participants’ performance on a
“relatively non-demanding” test that had been designed by the Treatment
Competence Subgroup of the MacArthur Foundation’s Research Network
on Mental Health and the Law.84  The study found that, even on this more
limited test of competence, over 60% of the voluntary patients they tested
“demonstrated impaired capacity to consent . . . .”85
D. The Alternative of Guardians and Other Third-Party Decision Makers
Perhaps in recognition of the tension between the law’s systemic pref-
erence for voluntary admissions on the one hand and the limited capacity
of many psychiatric inpatients to provide fully informed consent on the
other, both the Zinermon majority and the APA took the position that
guardians or other properly authorized third-party decision makers might
be relied upon to provide the consent needed for admission.  Thus, in his
majority opinion in Zinermon, Justice Blackmun noted that protections for
due process might include “appointment of a guardian advocate to make
treatment decisions . . . .”86  The APA had endorsed the use of third-party
surrogate decision makers even before Zinermon, and in its assessment of
the issue after Zinermon, the APA’s Task Force elaborated, by stating that
such surrogates might include guardians, family members, or others au-
thorized by state law to make decisions on behalf of the impaired
patient.87
83. Norman G. Poythress et al., Capacity to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization:
Searching for a Satisfactory Zinermon Screen, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439,
441 (1996).
84. See id. at 441–42, 447.
85. See id. at 447.  The research participants were 120 persons initially brought
to “crisis stabilization units” (CSU) in Florida. See id. at 442–43.  Half of the sub-
jects had been involuntarily admitted following assessment by a psychiatrist and
half had been “permitted to sign into the CSU as voluntary treatment patients [ ].”
Id. at 443.  Surprisingly, even more of the voluntary patients failed the minimal
competency test used by the researchers than did the involuntary patients. See id.
at 447.  The authors speculate that this might have been the result, in part, of the
psychiatrists’ practice of denying patients who refused to consent to take psycho-
tropic medications the opportunity to be admitted as voluntary patients. See id. at
448–49.  The suggestion here is that some number of these refusers may actually
have had more capacity to process information than did those patients who agreed
to treatment and were admitted voluntarily. See id. at 449.
86. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 134 (1990).
87. See Halverson, supra note 4, at 172–73.
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It is not difficult to understand why substitute decision makers are an
attractive alternative in this setting.  As noted, an expansive reading of the
Zinermon majority opinion, that takes seriously the full implications of Jus-
tice Blackmun’s dicta, creates a potential gap in the treatment system of
considerable moment.  As Donald Stone has explained:
Mentally ill persons who are incapable of giving informed con-
sent to admission may not necessarily meet the statutory standard
for involuntary placement. . . .  Therefore, some patients who are
incapable of providing informed consent to psychiatric hospitali-
zation will not meet the criteria for involuntary confinement and
may be discharged.
By guarding against undue pressure and influence to accept pa-
tients lacking in capacity to consent, some mentally ill persons
who want to receive inpatient care may be denied treatment as
long as they can live safely outside an institution.88
One potentially effective solution to this problem is to rely on eligible
third-party decision makers.  These substitute decision makers could be
appointed by a court (usually in the role of guardian or conservator),
identified in advance by the patient through a properly executed advance
directive,89 or authorized by state statutes that empower family members
or others close to the individual.90  Advance directives are not widely used
for mental health treatment; consequently, third-party decision makers ar-
ranged by the patient are infrequently available.91  A number of states per-
mit other designated third-party decision makers to provide consent for
psychiatric treatment without special court approval.92  An additional
group of states expressly prohibits surrogates from making these treat-
ment decisions, absent judicial authorization.93  In most jurisdictions,
however, the law with respect to the authority of third-parties other than
guardians or conservators is unsettled, at best.94  By a process of elimina-
tion, therefore, court-appointed guardians become an important potential
resource in many jurisdictions for managing the decision-making process
by which inpatient psychiatric treatment might be arranged for those per-
sons with mental disabilities who are unable to provide adequate informed
consent on their own.  Unfortunately, with some notable exceptions, the
law in many states governing the power of guardians to arrange for the
psychiatric hospitalization of their adult wards without utilizing the full
process for involuntary civil commitment is underdeveloped, confused, or
88. Stone, supra note 4, at 37.
89. See Winick, supra note 24, at 57.
90. See Halverson, supra note 4, at 173.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 174.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 173–75.
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inadequate.  Before turning to a consideration of that body of law, how-
ever, a brief discussion of guardianships more generally, and of the diffi-
cult issue of incompetency that ordinarily triggers the appointment of a
guardian, is in order.
III. INCOMPETENCY AND GUARDIANSHIP
A. The Presumption of Competency
For the most part, adults over the age of eighteen are presumed com-
petent to manage their own affairs, including making health-care treat-
ment decisions.95  The most commonly employed mechanism for
overcoming the standing presumption of competency is a judicial hearing,
at which a finding of general incompetency or incompetency with respect
to a specific decision or function may result in the court’s appointment of
a general or limited guardian.96  This reliance on judicial hearings to de-
termine incompetency is a relatively recent development.  Before the
1960s, the legal status of incompetency was most often established by way
of a different legal presumption contrary to the ordinary presumption of
adult competence, which was triggered by the involuntary commitment
(and sometimes even voluntary hospitalization) of an individual with a
mental disability.97  In most jurisdictions, this presumption of incompe-
tency was irrebuttable; thus, a determination that an individual was subject
to civil commitment was the “equivalent of a finding of general incompe-
tency . . . .”98  As time went along, some states adjusted this rule to make
psychiatric hospitalization the basis for a rebuttable rather than irrebut-
table presumption of incompetency.99  Nevertheless, the great majority of
patients who were hospitalized for mental illness or other mental disabili-
ties were deemed incompetent and thus lost the power to enter into con-
tracts, to initiate lawsuits, to marry or divorce, to decide where to live, and
to consent to medical care.100
More recently, a great many clinicians and legal advocates have con-
cluded that mental illnesses and other mental disabilities that are severe
enough to warrant inpatient treatment do not necessarily render patients
entirely incapable of making all significant decisions or otherwise partici-
pating in a variety of daily activities associated with managing their own
affairs.101  As a result, the irrebuttable presumption that a person subject
to involuntary commitment (or voluntary hospitalization) is generally in-
95. See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implica-
tions for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 6, 41 (1995).
96. See BARBARA A. WEINER & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL
HEALTH CARE 287–90 (1993).
97. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 222.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 940.
101. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 223; WEINER & WETTSTEIN,
supra note 96, at 116.
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competent has been abrogated, replaced either by a rebuttable presump-
tion of incompetence or, more commonly, by the ordinary background
norm that all adults are presumed competent until found otherwise by a
court of appropriate jurisdiction.102  As a rule, the determination of gen-
eral incompetency is now legally distinct from the decision to civilly com-
mit an individual for inpatient treatment.103  As civil commitment
increasingly has come to be centered on the state’s police power interest
in restraining and treating patients whose mental disability poses a danger
to themselves or to others,104 the state’s parens patriae interest in caring for
those who are incapable of caring for themselves increasingly has become
concentrated in the judicial process by which incompetency (and guardi-
anship) are determined.105
The now common presumption that patients subject to psychiatric
hospitalization should be deemed competent unless a court makes con-
trary findings is, of course, relevant to the Zinermon dicta suggesting that
voluntary patients must be capable of providing consent for admission.106
Depending on the definition of competency one employs, however, re-
search suggests that a significant portion of the population of voluntary
patients in mental hospitals and specialized psychiatric units likely cannot
engage fully in the cognitive process by which information relevant to the
hospitalization decision must be evaluated in order to meet a standard of
fully informed consent.107  Some states now routinely require voluntary
patients, involuntary patients, or both to be screened for competency, and
some routinely petition the appropriate court for the appointment of a
guardian when the patient is determined to be incapable of providing the
necessary consent either for admission, in the case of voluntary patients,
or for other treatment decisions such as the administration of psycho-
tropic medications, in the case of involuntary patients.108  There are signif-
icant limitations on the resources available to support such a widespread
102. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 222–23.
103. See id. at 223.
104. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 26–27.
105. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 222–23; see also BRAKEL ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 370.
106. A very different approach pertained in the 1950s, when the National In-
stitute of Mental Health took the position that voluntary psychiatric patients need
not be competent to consent to hospitalization. See NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL
HEALTH, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING THE HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL, PUB-
LIC HEALTH SERV. PUB. NO. 51 (1951), available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Re
cord/006203370.  Paul Appelbaum reports that this decision led many states to
adopt the same approach. See Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 1060.  The governing
assumption for this policy was that “the benefits of voluntary hospitalization, in-
cluding a presumed acknowledgment of a need for treatment, a stronger alliance
with treatment personnel, and avoidance of the stigma of court hearings, should
not be denied non-objecting patients, even if they would not meet ordinary com-
petence criteria.” Id.
107. See Grossman & Summers, supra note 2, at 206.
108. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 223.
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use of guardians for all patients who might be regarded as incompetent, at
least according to some reasonably demanding conception of competency,
not the least of which is the limited availability of persons willing and able
to serve in that capacity.109  As noted above, there are also important legal
restrictions on the authority of guardians in many jurisdictions to perform
as substitute decision makers in order to provide the consent needed, at
least in the case of approving voluntary psychiatric hospitalization.110
B. Determining Incompetency
Incompetency, which ordinarily is the standard by which a guardian-
ship is authorized,111 is subject to significant contest, both as to its defini-
tion and its legal significance.112  The range of important legal
consequences that flow from a finding of incompetency by a court turns
on a constellation of criteria that may not be entirely appropriate when
clinicians seek to evaluate the competency of patients for other purposes,
including questions of medical management or treatment.113  A classic
discussion of the factors relevant to evaluating competency—originally de-
veloped by Paul Appelbaum and Loren Roth for the purpose of determin-
ing the capacity of individuals with mental disabilities to consent to
research—provides useful tools for considering both legal and clinical
competency and has become a common starting point for commentators
in this field.114  Originally conceived as a hierarchy of capacities, Professor
Appelbaum subsequently suggested that each of the four categories of
functionality he and his colleague identified might apply differently and
might hold independent significance, depending on the individual cir-
cumstances presented by any particular individual whose competency is to
be assessed.115  Logically, however, for most purposes, the four areas of
capacity they describe form a set of criteria of apparent ascending
importance.116
The first is the capacity to evidence a choice.117  Ordinarily, even se-
verely mentally disabled individuals are able to communicate their agree-
109. See id. at 224–25.
110. For a further discussion of the various legal restrictions on the authority
of guardians, see supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.
111. Although, “[t]he trend in the law has been to abandon the term incompe-
tent and refer to the person as incapacitated or disabled, since this is less pejorative.”
WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 96, at 282.
112. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 215–16; Winick, supra note
95, at 6.
113. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 215; WEINER & WETTSTEIN,
supra note 96, at 116; cf. Roca, supra note 2, at 1177.
114. See generally Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Competency to Consent to
Research: A Psychiatric Overview, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 951 (1982).
115. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Mental Illness and Competence to
Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 110 (1995).
116. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 932.
117. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 952–53.
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ment or disagreement with a proposed decision, though the basis for that
assent or refusal may not always be entirely rational or grounded in objec-
tive fact.  Occasionally, however, a patient is either entirely incapable of
communication, or provides a mix of verbal and/or nonverbal signals that
are so inconsistent that a clear indication of the patient’s choice is impossi-
ble to discern.  For the most part, though, relatively few incompetency de-
terminations are based on this first sort of incapacity.118
The second set of functional capacities identified by Appelbaum and
Roth are more consequential and govern the analysis in a greater number
of cases.  They relate to an individual’s ability to understand the facts cen-
tral to a proposed decision or task.119  These capacities are largely cogni-
tive in nature.  Where a particular choice is contemplated, the required
matters that must be understood include the options open to decision and
the respective costs and benefits of electing one or another of these op-
tions.120  In the case of decision making with respect to medical care, this
sort of factual understanding includes a clear comprehension of the pro-
posed intervention, the likelihood of success, the risks and potential side
effects associated with the treatment, and the available alternative options
along with their risks and potential benefits.121
The level of detail and complexity of the information deemed essen-
tial for a competent decision varies considerably, depending on the sub-
ject under consideration and the judgment of the evaluator.122  Beyond
the question of detail and complexity, Appelbaum and Roth helpfully di-
vide this second category of functional capacity into two sub-categories
that further refine the assessment process.  The first sub-category goes to
the individual’s basic “ability to understand” relevant facts, while the sec-
ond concerns the individual’s more refined capacity to demonstrate “ac-
tual understanding” of those facts.123  An evaluator might determine that
a patient has the basic ability to understand the facts bearing on a decision
by exploring whether he or she has a grasp of facts of a similar order or
level of complexity, or perhaps by asking him or her to identify relevant
information on a written list of alternatives.124  The more demanding
question is whether the patient can exhibit “actual understanding” by re-
118. See id.
119. See id. at 953–54.
120. See id.
121. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 219 (“The patient ought to
have the ability to understand the proposed interventions, including their risks,
benefits, and the possible alternatives.  For example, an acutely psychotic patient
should understand that psychotropic medication carries the risk of dystonic reac-
tions . . . ; that the benefit is the probable resolution of the psychotic episode; and
that alternatives include psychotherapy and milieu therapy, and possibly ECT, but
that at least the two former alternatives carry a lower short-term success rate than
does medication.”).
122. See Roca, supra note 2, at 1195.
123. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 953.
124. See Poythress et al., supra note 83, at 951.
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peating back information he or she has been given, by paraphrasing that
information in his or her own words, or by showing some comprehension
of the consequences of the choices that are available.125
Closely related to the demonstration of an actual understanding of
essential facts is the third functional capacity described by Appelbaum and
Roth, the ability to apply that information in a “rational” process of delib-
eration.126  Other writers, most prominently Michael Moore, have elabo-
rated on the central role that “practical reasoning” plays in assessing an
individual’s moral agency.  In its most essential form, this practical reason-
ing—or rational deliberation—requires the decision maker to go through
a process of weighing the relative costs and benefits of competing choices
in order to arrive at a decision.127  This practical reasoning is said to have
moral significance, in part because the very process of assigning weight to
these various costs and benefits necessarily draws upon the individual’s
foundational normative commitments and value structure.128
In any event, a system in which competency is evaluated according to
an individual’s capacity to engage in the rational manipulation of informa-
tion must contend with several challenges.  The first follows from the
moral significance assigned by Moore and others to the process of practi-
cal reasoning.  By definition, the assessment of another’s rationality is
highly subjective, precisely because the judgment that another has arrived
at a rational decision likely turns, at some level, on agreement between the
assessor and the decision maker with respect to the relative weights as-
signed to the risks and benefits of the choices under consideration.129  Be-
yond the problem of subjectivity, the rational manipulation criterion also
runs into potential difficulty when the patient being evaluated holds false
beliefs with respect to one or more facts that enter into the practical rea-
soning process.130  Appelbaum and Roth point out that the law has long
125. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 953–54.
126. See id. at 954.
127. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091
(1985); see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELA-
TIONSHIP 9–112 (1984).
128. See Gary Watson, Free Agency, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 84 (John Martin
Fischer ed., 1986).
129. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 954.  This point has been
pressed with particular vigor by Duncan Kennedy, who has argued that the deci-
sion to overrule another’s choice cannot be explained by a neutral conception of
capacity, because “the question of capacity is hopelessly intertwined with the ques-
tion of what the other wants to do in this particular case.”  Duncan Kennedy, Dis-
tributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 644 (1982).
For Kennedy, the focus of some commentators and courts on the ability of an
individual to undertake a rational decision-making process is effectively a cover for
an underlying paternalism (perhaps necessary under the circumstances) of acting
contrary to the wishes of the individual, in order to protect what another deter-
mines to be the incapacitated person’s best interests. See id. at 642–46.
130. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 218 (stating that determining
patient’s ability rationally to manipulate information requires examination of “the
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treated the presence of “insane delusions” as adequate grounds for a find-
ing that an individual lacks contractual or testimonial capacity, thus pro-
viding a basis to invalidate a contract or will executed on the basis of such
false beliefs.131  But individuals with mental illness or other mental disabil-
ities may suffer impairments that impact the rationality of particular
choices or behaviors without affecting their cognitive processes more glob-
ally.  Because “the impact of delusions, for example, may be limited to a
discrete area of mental functioning,” the fact that a patient holds false
beliefs relating to one set of issues may not be relevant to his or her capac-
ity to assess the relative risks and benefits of a proposed course of action
unrelated to his or her thought disorder.132  The question in such cases,
then, is whether the individual should be regarded as competent to make
the decisions and manage the portions of his or her affairs unaffected by
the cognitive dysfunction caused by the mental disability.133
The fourth competency identified by Appelbaum and Roth is the abil-
ity to “appreciat[e] the nature of the situation.”134  Appreciation, they ex-
plain, is distinct from factual understanding in that it requires the
individual to possess the ability to apply the abstract information he or she
has been provided to a concrete circumstance, most commonly the indi-
vidual’s immediate situation.135  It is one thing, for example, to under-
stand that the rules governing voluntary admission formally limit patients’
ability to leave the hospital without providing forty-eight hours’ notice; it is
quite another for patients to appreciate that staff will stop them if they
attempt to walk out the front door of the hospital.  Beyond the application
of abstract knowledge to concrete circumstances, the capacity of apprecia-
basic components of the patient’s mental status: orientation, memory, intellectual
functioning, judgment, impairment in rationality (hallucinations and delusions),
and alterations of mood”).
131. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 952–56.  Elyn Saks takes a
somewhat different approach.  She has endorsed a standard for determining com-
petency to consent to treatment that requires the patient to possess a level of fac-
tual understanding in which he or she harbors no “patently false beliefs” about
that information, but does not require any demonstration of an ability to rationally
manipulate the information. See generally Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treat-
ment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945 (1991).
132. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 954.
133. Robert Roca explains that assigning a diagnosis of, for example, schizo-
phrenia, bipolar disorder, or dementia, while relevant to an assessment of compe-
tency to consent, does not “in and of itself, invariably impl[y] incompetency.”
Roca, supra note 2, at 1187.  This is so, he continues, because the cognitive impair-
ment or thought disorder associated with the diagnosed illness or condition may
have no relationship to the particular decision (or task) for which the competency
assessment is being made. See id.  In such instances, where the impairment does
not “imply global decisional incapacity,” it may be possible for the clinician (and
thus a court) to conclude that the individual remains competent with respect to
the particular choice at issue. See id.
134. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 954–56.
135. See id.
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tion also entails the integration of cognition and affect.136  In a different
context, the drafters of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal
Code provision governing the insanity defense recognized this insight
when they altered the common law M’Naghten test for criminal defendants
asserting a defense of insanity.  Under the ALI test, the inquiry is not what
a criminal defendant “knew” about the facts relevant to the offense, which
was the prevailing common law standard, but whether the defendant was
able to fully “appreciate” the significance of that information.137  In ex-
plaining this shift in emphasis, the Model Penal Code drafters observed
that appreciation of the wrongfulness of one’s conduct entails a mature
understanding of and emotional connection with its consequences.138
Clearly, requiring an individual to have this sort of appreciation, particu-
larly regarding the decision whether to agree to enter an inpatient facility
for mental health treatment, is a demanding standard for many patients
with acute mental disabilities.  If this capacity were part of the matrix nec-
essary for legal competency, and if due process were understood to re-
quire informed consent measured in such a fashion, many patients who
would otherwise be admitted as voluntary patients would lose that oppor-
tunity and would be limited to involuntary hospitalization, outpatient
treatment, or no treatment at all.
The Appelbaum and Roth competency criteria, taken as a whole, are
focused on the process by which a decision is made and not on the out-
come of that decision-making process.  One could also assess competency,
however, by evaluating outcomes, with little or no attention to the process
through which information supporting a choice has been obtained and
weighed.  This fundamental distinction between a process-based approach
and an outcomes-centered approach to competency determinations is cru-
cial in shaping the law governing adult guardianship.139
136. See id.
137. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962) (Mental Disease or
Defect Excluding Responsibility).
138. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1985).
139. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 947.  In a slightly different
context, Robert Roca has offered the following example, which helps to illuminate
this key distinction:
Consider an elderly man who refuses to stop smoking despite severe pro-
gressive obstructive pulmonary disease.  His physicians inform him that
he is hastening his demise by continuing to smoke.  He retorts that he
does not believe smoking is harming him and that in fact he relaxes and
breathes more comfortably when he smokes.  His choice is unwise, unrea-
sonable, and at odds with general knowledge about the relationship be-
tween smoking and pulmonary disease.  A psychiatric evaluation is
requested and reveals no evidence of dementia, major depression, or any
other capacity-compromising psychiatric syndrome.  His refusal to accept
commonly-held beliefs about the relationship between smoking and lung
disease might lead ardent anti-smokers to question his “competency,” and
this challenge might be sustained if there were no requirement for the
demonstration of a disabling psychiatric disorder.
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The traditional state law approach governing the appointment of
guardians for incompetent adults has focused on whether the individual is
capable of making decisions that produce reasonable outcomes.  More re-
cently, a number of states have adopted an alternative approach, devel-
oped as part of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which shifts the
emphasis from reasonable outcomes to the soundness of the individual’s
decision-making process itself.  In response to a concern that the UPC’s
process-based approach is too subjective, a third alternative has appeared
in some states that centers on the capacity of the individual to undertake
specific tasks having to do with essential functions such as housing, health
care, and nutrition.
An adult under guardianship could have considerable actual capacity
to participate in the decision to seek inpatient treatment, could be only
partially impaired, or could be largely incapable of usefully contributing to
that decision-making process, depending upon which of these legal re-
gimes for the appointment of a guardian the court has employed.  Moreo-
ver, a ward might express agreement with the inpatient placement,
express no opinion, or make clear his or her opposition to the plan.  The
authority of a guardian to arrange a voluntary admission ought to reflect
an assessment of both the ward’s capacity for engaging in the decision-
making process and producing reasonable outcomes.  In some instances,
where the ward is capable of reasonable judgment and has communicated
his or her agreement with inpatient admission, the guardian should be
permitted to exercise considerable discretion.  In other instances, where
the ward is more severely impaired and/or has not conveyed agreement
with the inpatient placement, judicial oversight will be essential.  The legal
formula for managing this complex relationship between adult wards and
their guardians facing a hospitalization decision ordinarily will derive from
the statutes governing voluntary admissions together with the state law set-
ting out the powers of guardians.  This Article now turns to a considera-
tion of that body of law.
Roca, supra note 2, at 1188.
From a process-based point of view, it would be difficult, though not impossi-
ble, to conclude that the smoker in the above example is incompetent.  His belief
that smoking is not harming his health is a false belief judged against objective
medical evidence, and under a rigorous version of the process approach, one
might argue that his capacity to rationally assess the relevant evidence is therefore
impaired.  Virtually all of the other process-focused criteria identified by Appel-
baum and Roth, however, point in the other direction.  The elderly patient is
clearly communicating his choice, understands (and probably appreciates) all of
the other facts relevant to the decision, and has applied that understanding in the
process of weighing his options.  A more paternalistic outcomes-based perspective,
on the other hand, might well support the conclusion that the elderly smoker is
incompetent, given that his choice is clearly not in his objective best interest.
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IV. SEEKING A BALANCE OF INTERESTS: A REVIEW OF STATE LAWS
The authority of a court-appointed guardian to consent to voluntary
inpatient psychiatric treatment for his or her ward varies from state to
state.  In some jurisdictions, the guardian’s authority turns on whether the
ward has objected to the proposed hospitalization, has indicated consent,
or has failed to protest the admission.  Often, the guardian’s ability to au-
thorize inpatient treatment depends on how state law views the ward’s ca-
pacity following the guardian’s appointment.  Thus, the ward may
categorically be regarded as legally incompetent under state law by virtue
of the court’s appointment of a general guardian, or the ward may be
understood as having partial decision-making capacity to the extent that
he or she can in fact make a reasonable choice with respect to hospitaliza-
tion, notwithstanding the court’s prior guardianship decision.140  In addi-
tion, state laws vary on whether a patient subject to voluntary psychiatric
hospitalization must be capable of giving informed consent.  This variation
in state law reflects, in part, ongoing uncertainty about whether the Su-
preme Court’s majority decision in the Zinermon case made the capacity to
provide such consent (or some lesser degree of decision-making compe-
tence, as suggested by the APA Task Force recommendations) a require-
ment of federal due process.141
In more than a half-dozen states, a guardian may provide consent for
the voluntary psychiatric hospitalization of his or her adult ward.  In Geor-
gia, for example, guardians have broad decision-making authority under
the guardian powers statutes and the voluntary commitment law that to-
gether appear to provide a sufficient foundation for providing consent to
inpatient care.142  In Maine, a guardian may provide consent unless the
adult ward objected at an earlier time when he or she had capacity, in
which case court approval for inpatient psychiatric treatment is re-
quired.143  North Carolina’s guardian statute is especially broad, providing
140. See, e.g., Pima Cnty. Pub. Fiduciary v. Superior Court for Pima Cnty., 546
P.2d 354, 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing and quoting In re Sherrill’s Estate,
373 P.2d 353 (Ariz. 1962) (in banc)).
141. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
142. See GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-20 (2014) (authorizing guardian to make appli-
cation for ward’s voluntary commitment); see also id. § 29-4-21(a)(3) (“[T]he ap-
pointment of a guardian shall remove from the ward the power to . . . [c]onsent to
medical treatment . . . .”); id. § 29-4-23(a)(2) (allowing guardian to “give any con-
sents or approvals that may be necessary for medical or other professional care,
counsel, treatment, or service for the ward”).
143. Under Maine’s guardian powers statute, a guardian is authorized to pro-
vide consent for medical and other care or treatment: “A guardian may give or
withhold consents or approvals related to medical or other professional care,
counsel, treatment or service for the ward.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-
312(a)(3) (2013).  However, if a guardian’s decision is against the wishes of his or
her ward, as expressed by the ward when the ward had capacity, then court ap-
proval is necessary. See id. § 5-806; see also Guardianship of Boyle, 674 A.2d 912,
915 (Me. 1996) (“The guardian of an incapacitated person has the same powers
that ‘a parent has respecting [the parent’s] unemancipated minor child,’ unless
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR101.txt unknown Seq: 26  9-MAR-15 10:26
26 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 1
the guardian with the power to “give any consent or approval that may be
necessary to enable the ward to receive medical, legal, psychological, or
other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service . . . .”144  In South
Dakota, if the ward “presents” to a psychiatric facility, the ward’s guardian
may provide consent for voluntary inpatient treatment.145
The statutory provisions in Wisconsin governing the provision of psy-
chiatric treatment for an incompetent adult suggest a similar approach.
With respect to healthcare generally, the Wisconsin guardian powers stat-
ute makes clear that a guardian has:
[T]he power to give an informed consent to the voluntary receipt
by the guardian’s ward of a medical examination, medication,
modified by court order.  This authority includes the giving or withholding of con-
sent or approval related to medical care.” (alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-312(a)) (citing ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, §5-312(a)(3))).
144. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1241(a)(3) (2013).  North Carolina’s guardian
powers statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) To the extent that it is not inconsistent with the terms of any order of
the clerk or any other court of competent jurisdiction, a guardian of the
person has the following powers and duties:
(3) The guardian of the person may give any consent or approval
that may be necessary to enable the ward to receive medical, legal,
psychological, or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or ser-
vice; provided that, if the patient has a health care agent appointed
pursuant to a valid health care power of attorney, the health care
agent shall have the right to exercise the authority granted in the
health care power of attorney unless the Clerk has suspended the
authority of that health care agent . . . .  The guardian of the person
may give any other consent or approval on the ward’s behalf that may
be required or in the ward’s best interest.  The guardian may petition
the clerk for the clerk’s concurrence in the consent or approval.
Id. § 35A-1241(a), (a)(3).  Significantly, in directing the guardian’s decision mak-
ing with respect to the ward’s place of abode, the statute sets out a preference for
residences that are not treatment facilities and for treatment facilities that are com-
munity-based.  Nevertheless, the authority to consent to inpatient psychiatric treat-
ment is not expressly foreclosed by the statute:
(2) The guardian of the person may establish the ward’s place of abode
within or without this State. . . .  The guardian also shall give preference
to places that are not treatment facilities.  If the only available and appro-
priate places of domicile are treatment facilities, the guardian shall give
preference to community-based treatment facilities, such as group homes
or nursing homes, over treatment facilities that are not community-based.
Id. § 35A-1241(a)(2).
North Carolina’s voluntary admissions statute authorizes a health care agent/
surrogate to provide proxy consent, but it does not address the authority of a
guardian in that regard. See id. § 122C-211.  Nevertheless, it appears that the
guardian powers statute controls in the absence of an agent/surrogate.
145. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-8-18.1(1)–(4) (2014) (“If a person eigh-
teen years of age or older presents for admission to an inpatient psychiatric facility
and meets the requirements . . . but the facility director or administrator deter-
mines that the person is incapable of exercising an informed consent to the admis-
sion, then the person may be admitted upon exercise of a substituted informed
consent: [ ] [b]y a guardian . . . [or other possible surrogate decision makers].”).
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including any appropriate psychotropic medication, and medical
treatment that is in the ward’s best interest, if the guardian has
first made a good-faith attempt to discuss with the ward the vol-
untary receipt of the examination, medication, or treatment and
if the ward does not protest.146
With respect to consent for inpatient treatment particularly, Wisconsin law
authorizes the guardian of an incompetent adult to provide consent for
the voluntary admission of the ward to an inpatient treatment facility in
cases where the ward does not indicate a desire to leave the facility, if
general statutory procedures for voluntary admission are followed.147
Statutes in Michigan permit the guardian of an adult ward to author-
ize inpatient psychiatric treatment if the patient “assents,” although this
power is limited to “formal” voluntary admissions.148  In Missouri, a guard-
ian can consent to voluntary hospitalization for thirty days, after which a
court order is required.149  In North Dakota, a guardian of an adult can
consent to voluntary psychiatric hospitalization for up to forty-five days
without an authorizing court order.150
146. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25(2)(d) (West 2014).
147. See id. § 51.10(8) (“An adult for whom, because of incompetency, a
guardian of the person has been appointed in this state may be voluntarily admit-
ted to an inpatient treatment facility if the guardian consents after the require-
ments of sub. (4m)(a)1. are satisfied or if the guardian and the ward consent to
the admission under this section.”).
148. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1415 (2014).  Section 330.1411, on the
other hand, deals with informal voluntary admissions and indicates that only pa-
tients themselves can apply to be admitted in this fashion. See id. § 330.1411. But
see id. § 330.1415 (governing formal voluntary admissions).  While almost identical,
section 330.1415 provides:
[A]n individual 18 years of age or over may be hospitalized as a formal
voluntary patient if the individual executes an application for hospitaliza-
tion as a formal voluntary patient or the individual assents and the full
guardian of the individual, the limited guardian with authority to admit,
or a patient advocate authorized by the individual to make mental health
treatment decisions under the estates and protected individuals code exe-
cutes an application for hospitalization and if the hospital director con-
siders the individual to be clinically suitable for that form of
hospitalization.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.1101–700.8102; 1998
Mich. Pub. Acts 386).
149. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.120 (West 2014) (permitting guardian to make
application for voluntary hospitalization of ward). But see id. § 475.120(5) (placing
limit on guardian’s ability to have ward admitted: “No guardian of the person shall
have authority to seek admission of the guardian’s ward to a mental health or
intellectual disability facility for more than thirty days for any purpose without
court order except as otherwise provided by law.”).
150. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12(2) (2013) (“[N]o guardian may volun-
tarily admit a ward to a mental health facility or state institution for a period of
more than forty-five days without a mental health commitment proceeding or
other court order.”).  The negative implication is that a guardian may voluntarily
admit a ward to a treatment facility for forty-five days or less.  The Supreme Court
of North Dakota has considered whether this guardian powers statute applies in
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In more than a dozen states, by contrast, the law is settled that a
guardian is not authorized to consent to voluntary psychiatric hospitaliza-
tion if the ward either has not provided or is incapable of providing in-
formed consent.  In these states, the guardian seeking inpatient treatment
for his or her ward ordinarily will be required to initiate an involuntary
commitment process.  States in this category include Alaska,151 Illinois,152
the case of a ward admitted to a care facility (a locked dementia unit), and has
concluded, based on legislative history, that it does not. See In re Guardianship/
Conservatorship of Van Sickle, 694 N.W.2d 212, 218–21 (N.D. 2005).  The guard-
ian in Van Sickle was permitted to place his ward in this facility without first ob-
taining a court order. See id.  The clear implication of this holding is that, in
circumstances in which the ward is to be admitted to a psychiatric facility as op-
posed to a care facility, for a period longer than forty-five days, the guardian will be
required to obtain an authorizing court order.
151. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150(e), (e)(1) (2014) (prohibiting guardians
from placing wards in psychiatric facilities: “A guardian may not [ ] place the ward
in a facility or institution for the mentally ill other than through a formal commit-
ment proceeding under [Alaska Stat. §] 47.30 in which the ward has a separate
guardian ad litem . . . .”).
152. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(a) (West 2014) (“A guardian of
the person may not admit a ward to a mental health facility except at the ward’s
request as provided in Article IV of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabili-
ties Code and unless the ward has the capacity to consent to such admission as
provided in Article IV of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Code.”).  This provision is consistent with the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision in
In re Gardner, in which the court held that a guardian cannot authorize the admis-
sion of a non-consenting ward to a mental health treatment facility as a voluntary
patient. See In re Gardner, 459 N.E.2d 17, 20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).  The ward in
Gardner lacked the capacity to provide informed consent for inpatient treatment,
but was not dangerous. See id. at 18.  The court, although recognizing that the
ward would not be subject to hospitalization under the involuntary commitment
statute, nevertheless refused to allow the guardian the authority to consent to vol-
untary inpatient treatment. See id. at 20; see also In re Guardianship of Muellner v.
Blessing Hosp., 782 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“[A] trial court may not
grant a guardian the power to admit a nonconsenting ward to a mental health
facility for treatment as a voluntary patient.” (citing In re Gardner, 459 N.E.2d at
20)).
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Maryland,153 Montana,154 New York,155 Pennsylvania,156 Texas,157 and
the District of Columbia.158
153. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2014)
(setting out functions of guardians and providing the “right to custody of the dis-
abled person and to establish his place of abode within and without the State,
provided there is court authorization for any change in the classification of abode,
except that no one may be committed to a mental facility without an involuntary
commitment proceeding as provided by law”).
154. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-111 (2013).  While Montana’s voluntary
admission statute is silent as to whether a guardian can make an application to
have a ward admitted, it does contain an informed consent requirement that sug-
gests that the patient must provide informed consent. See id.  Additionally, the
guardian powers statute appears to limit a guardian’s ability to place a ward in an
inpatient psychiatric facility. See id. § 72-5-321.  Although it permits a guardian to
give consent for medical and other care, and generally provides that the guardian
of an adult ward has the same powers that parents have with respect to the care of
their children, the statute then goes on to limit this power in the mental health
context:
A full guardian or limited guardian may not involuntarily commit for
mental health treatment or for treatment of a developmental disability or
for observation or evaluation a ward who is unwilling or unable to give
informed consent to commitment . . . unless the procedures for involun-
tary commitment set forth in Title 53, chapters 20 and 21, are followed.
Id. § 72-5-321(5).
155. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(b)(1) (McKinney 2014) (“No guard-
ian may: [ ] consent to the voluntary formal or informal admission of the incapaci-
tated person to a mental hygiene facility . . . .” (informal admission refers to
voluntary admission)); see also id. § 9.13 (governing voluntary admissions but not
authorizing a guardian to provide consent or make application); id. § 9.17 (provid-
ing informed consent requirements but not authorizing a guardian to provide
proxy consent).
156. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5521(f) (2013) (setting out the “[p]owers and
duties not granted to [a] guardian”).  Section 5521(f) provides: “The court may
not grant to a guardian powers controlled by other statute, including, but not lim-
ited to, the power: [ ] [t]o admit the incapacitated person to an inpatient psychiat-
ric facility or State center for the mentally retarded.” Id.  In addition, the
Pennsylvania statutes governing voluntary hospitalization do not contain any lan-
guage that can be construed to authorize guardian consent. See 50 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 4402, 4403, 7201, 7203.
157. See TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. § 1151.051(c)(4) (West 2014) (providing
that guardians have “power to consent to medical, psychiatric, and surgical treat-
ment other than the inpatient psychiatric commitment of the ward”).  However,
the statute qualifies this provision:
Notwithstanding Subsection (c)(4), a guardian of the person of a ward
has the power to personally transport the ward or to direct the ward’s
transport by emergency medical services or other means to an inpatient
mental health facility for a preliminary examination in accordance with
Subchapters A and C, Chapter 573, Health and Safety Code.
Id. § 1151.051(d).
Thus, under Texas law, a guardian can arrange for his or her ward to be trans-
ported to a psychiatric facility for evaluation, but is not empowered to consent to
inpatient treatment.  The voluntary admissions statutes are also consistent with the
position that a guardian cannot provide the requisite consent. See TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 572.001, 572.002 (West 2013).
158. See D.C. CODE § 21-2047(b)(4) (2012) (providing that, among other
powers, guardians may “[c]onsent to medical examination and medical or other
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In Washington state, guardians may not arrange inpatient psychiatric
treatment for wards who are unwilling or unable to give informed consent,
unless the procedures for involuntary commitment are followed.159  This
statute, in effect, codifies the holding of the Court of Appeals of Washing-
ton in In re Guardianship of Anderson.160  In Anderson, the court construed
an earlier guardian powers provision to require the consent of the ward
for a voluntary admission, notwithstanding clear statutory language that
“permit[ted] public or private health facilities to accept ‘any person . . .
suitable . . . for care and treatment as mentally ill, or for observation as to
the existence of mental illness, . . .’ who applies for admission individually
or through their court-appointed guardian . . . .”161  The Anderson court
explained that the hospitalization of an incapacitated individual under
this section without his or her informed consent would constitute “invol-
untary incarceration,” which is only permissible under the state’s police
powers through the involuntary civil commitment process.162  The guard-
ian in Anderson had twice sought to have his ward committed under the
involuntary civil commitment process, but he had failed because the lower
court did not find that the ward was a danger “to self or others.”163  The
Court of Appeals made clear that it would permit inpatient treatment
under these circumstances only if a factual basis were established support-
ing either a finding of dangerousness or that the non-consenting ward was
“gravely disabled.”164
While the guardians of incompetent adults in Massachusetts at one
time did have the authority to consent to inpatient mental health care,
they no longer are permitted to do so.165  The evolution of Massachusetts
professional care, treatment, or advice for the ward”). But see id. § 21-2047.01 (lim-
iting guardians’ power in the mental health treatment context).  Section 21-
2047.01 states that:
A guardian shall not have the power: . . . [t]o consent to the involuntary
or voluntary civil commitment of an incapacitated individual who is al-
leged to be mentally ill and dangerous under any provision or proceed-
ing occurring under Chapter 5 of Title 21, except that a guardian may
function as a petitioner for the commitment consistent with the require-
ments of [the involuntary civil commitment statute] . . . .”
Id. § 21-2047.01(4) (emphasis added).
159. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.043(5) (2014) (providing additional duties
of guardian: “No guardian, limited guardian, or standby guardian may involuntarily
commit for mental health treatment, observation, or evaluation an alleged inca-
pacitated person who is unable or unwilling to give informed consent to such com-
mitment unless the procedures for involuntary commitment set forth in chapter
71.05 or 72.23 RCW are followed.” (emphasis added)).
160. 564 P.2d 1190 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
161. Id. at 1192 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.23.070 (repealed 1985)).
162. See id.
163. Id. at 1191.
164. Id. at 1192.
165. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-309(f) (West 2014) (“No guard-
ian shall be given the authority under this chapter to admit or commit an incapaci-
tated person to a mental health facility or a mental retardation facility . . . .”).
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law on this question is instructive, in part because of the shadow cast by a
changing understanding over the past forty-five years of the rights associ-
ated with involuntary commitment in the state.166  Before 1977, the guard-
ian of an adult ward could commit the ward to a mental health facility
without prior court approval, and such a commitment was treated as a
voluntary admission.167  In 1977, the state legislature enacted a statute
“regulating the powers of guardians to admit or commit wards to mental
health or retardation facilities without the consent of the wards.”168  The
new statute required judicial approval before an inpatient placement was
permitted on the consent of the guardian and required the court to find
that such a placement would be in the ward’s “best interests.”169  The 1977
revisions also required that the ward be present at the hearing at which
best interests were adjudicated and that counsel be provided if the ward
was indigent.170
In Doe v. Doe,171 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took up
the question of what was required under this “best interests” standard, par-
ticularly in instances in which the ward had not joined in the guardian’s
application for a voluntary admission.172  Under the circumstances of that
case, the court held that a showing of a “likelihood of serious harm,”
which was also a required element for involuntary commitment in the
state, would be necessary before judicial approval would be appropriate
for a guardian seeking the voluntary admission of a ward.173  The court
arrived at this conclusion expressly because “commitment pursuant to
[the guardian powers statute] produces the same loss of freedom and the
same label of mental illness as commitment under [the involuntary com-
mitment statute].”174  Thus, in order to insure that a voluntary inpatient
admission approved by a guardian without the ward’s consent would not
be permitted as an end-run around the state’s involuntary commitment
statue, the court concluded that essentially the same finding of dangerous-
166. In 1970, the state’s involuntary commitment statute was completely re-
vised. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 (West 2014).  A person is subject
to commitment under the revised provision if he or she is found to be mentally ill
and his or her discharge would create a “likelihood of serious harm.” Id. ch. 123,
§ 12.
167. See Doe v. Doe, 385 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Mass. 1979) (discussing and citing
Russell v. Russell, 147 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1958); Denny v. Tyler, 3 Allen 225, 227
(Mass. 1861); Allis v. Morton, 4 Gray 63 (Mass. 1855)); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 123, § 10(a).
168. 1977 Mass. Acts ch. 567.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. 385 N.E.2d 995 (Mass. 1979).
172. See id. at 999.
173. See id. at 1000.  In effect, the court held that the statutory requirement of
“best interests” could only be established, in cases in which the ward had withheld
consent, by a showing that his or her discharge from inpatient care would create a
“likelihood of serious harm.”
174. Id. at 1001.
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ness to self or others required for involuntary commitment was impliedly
required by the guardian powers statute’s “best interest” standard.175
Eventually, this skeptical intuition, reflected in the court’s construction of
the state’s guardian powers statute, was enacted into the statute itself,
which now flatly prohibits guardians from consenting to the voluntary hos-
pitalization of their wards without regard to any assessment of “best inter-
ests” or dangerousness.176
Significantly, while it appears that a guardian may not place an adult
ward in a mental health inpatient facility on a voluntary basis in Massachu-
setts, the state’s Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that an individual’s
health care proxy agent may accomplish precisely the same result, at least
under certain identified circumstances.177  In Cohen v. Bolduc,178 the court
construed Massachusetts’s health care proxy statute to permit such a vol-
untary admission, so long as the principal does not object to the place-
ment or revoke the proxy instrument.179  The Massachusetts statute
permitting individuals to give advance directives for health-care decisions
permits a proxy decision maker to arrange treatment for both physical and
mental disorders.180  The Cohen court acknowledged that the statute is not
explicit about whether “treatment” for mental disorders includes inpatient
hospitalization, but it concluded that both the State’s interest in promot-
ing patient autonomy and self-determination and the broad statutory
terms support the conclusion that a health-care proxy agent can consent
to such a voluntary placement if the principal does not object.181  Thus, in
175. See id.
176. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-309(f) (West 2014).  There re-
mains some tension in the statutory provisions governing the voluntary hospitaliza-
tion of adult wards in Massachusetts.  The voluntary admissions statute contains
language suggesting that guardians can apply for the voluntary commitment of
their wards under certain circumstances. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 10
(West 2014) (“The application may be made . . . by the guardian of a person on
behalf of a person under his guardianship.”); see also id. § 11 (suggesting that
guardians have some authority to apply to have their wards voluntarily admitted).
177. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-309(e) (providing that guardians
may not revoke the ward’s health care proxy without court order and “[i]f a health
care proxy is in effect, absent an order of the court to the contrary, a health-care
decision of the agent takes precedence over that of a guardian”).
178. 760 N.E.2d 714 (Mass. 2002).
179. See id. at 718–23.
180. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 1, 5 (West 2014).
181. See Cohen, 760 N.E.2d at 720.  The court pointed out that, under the
Massachusetts statute, the principal is permitted to revoke the proxy decision
maker’s authority even after a medical determination of incapacity has been made,
and, in any event, the “principal’s wishes will always prevail over those of her agent,
unless a judicial determination of her incapacity is obtained.” Id. at 722.  In in-
stances in which the principal does object to inpatient psychiatric treatment, the
court was clear that the same interests in autonomy and self-determination exer-
cised earlier in the proxy-granting document also operate in the withdrawal of the
proxy decision maker’s authority to consent to the voluntary placement. See id. at
723–24.  The court, however, left open the question of whether, under the Massa-
chusetts statute, a judicial determination that the principal “lacks capacity to make
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Massachusetts, a health care proxy agent may be authorized to consent to
voluntary psychiatric hospitalization if the patient is non-objecting, but if
the patient objects, the agent would have to obtain a court order or resort
to the involuntary commitment process.182
This distinction between an objecting versus a non-objecting patient,
which is key in Massachusetts for determining whether a health care proxy
agent will be accorded the authority to consent to inpatient psychiatric
treatment, is central as well to determining the authority of guardians of
adult wards in a number of other states.  In these states, the power of a
guardian to authorize voluntary inpatient treatment turns on whether the
ward has objected to the placement rather than on whether the ward has
affirmatively provided informed consent.  In Colorado, for example, a
guardian who wishes to arrange for the voluntary admission of his or her
ward must first demonstrate that the ward either agrees to or does not
object to the placement.  Even when the ward consents or fails to object,
the guardian still must notify the court within ten days of placing the ward
in an inpatient facility.  If the ward does object, the guardian must utilize
the state’s involuntary commitment process.183  In Ohio, a guardian may
consent to voluntary psychiatric hospitalization unless the ward or another
health care decisions” should permit the proxy to provide substitute consent. Id.
at 723.  The court did indicate that, in the ordinary case, the proxy decision
maker’s exercise of judgment should, in the first instance, be “in accordance with
an ‘assessment’ of her ‘wishes,’ or, if her wishes are unknown, an ‘assessment’ of
her ‘best interests.’” Id. at 721 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, § 5).
As part of its discussion of this issue, the court reported on the approaches
taken in a number of other states with advance directive/health care proxy stat-
utes.  In ten states, the law permits advance directives for mental health treatment
but prohibits both voluntary and involuntary commitments under these directives.
See id. at 718.  Three states allow such directives but prohibit only involuntary com-
mitment, and “[e]ight states allow commitment only if expressly authorized by the
principal” in the proxy-granting document. See id. at 718–19.  Four other states
require that a separate document be executed in order to permit the health care
proxy agent to consent to commitment. See id. at 719; see also Winick, supra note
24, at 57; cf. Dresser, supra note 24, at 777.
182. See Cohen, 760 N.E.2d at 723–24.
183. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-315(1)(d) (West 2014) (providing that
a guardian may “[c]onsent to medical or other care, treatment, or service for the
ward”). But see id. § 15-14-316(4) (providing limitation that “[a] guardian may not
initiate the commitment of a ward to a mental health care institution or facility
except in accordance with the state’s procedure for involuntary civil commit-
ment”).  Furthermore, section 15-14-316 makes clear that “[n]o guardian shall
have the authority to consent to any such care or treatment against the will of the
ward.” Id.  If the ward consents, however, then his or her guardian appears to have
authority to voluntarily admit the ward. See id. § 27-65-103(1) (“[A] ward . . . may
be admitted to hospital or institutional care and treatment for mental illness by
consent of the guardian for so long as the ward agrees to such care and treatment.
Within ten days of any such admission of the ward for such hospital or institutional
care and treatment, the guardian shall notify in writing the court that appointed
the guardian of the admission.”).
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“interested party” objects or the court has specifically withdrawn this
authority.184
In a number of states, the statutes setting out the power of guardians
to make decisions on behalf of their wards provide for the guardians’ au-
thority to consent to health-care services, make housing and other residen-
tial decisions, and obtain other human services.  Frequently, these statutes
do not specifically address whether these general powers include the au-
thority to consent to voluntary psychiatric hospitalization.  States in this
group include Alabama185 and West Virginia.186  Kentucky also falls within
this general category, although guardians in Kentucky whose wards are
developmentally disabled are expressly permitted to consent to voluntary
hospitalization.187  In New Mexico, a guardian is authorized to consent to
184. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02(B) (LexisNexis 2013) (authorizing
guardian to provide consent: “[T]he application also may be made . . . on behalf of
an adult incompetent person by the guardian or the person with custody of the
incompetent person.”); id. § 2111.13(C) (“A guardian of the person may authorize
or approve the provision to the ward of medical, health, or other professional care,
counsel, treatment, or services unless the ward or an interested party files objec-
tions with the probate court, or the court, by rule or order, provides otherwise.”).
185. See ALA. CODE § 26-2A-108 (2013) (conferring broad decision-making au-
thority upon guardians: “[A] guardian of an incapacitated person is responsible
for health, support, education, or maintenance of the ward . . . .”).  In addition,
this statute makes clear that the powers permitted to a guardian of an adult ward
are the same as those of a guardian of a minor, which include the ability to
“[c]onsent to medical or other professional care, treatment, or advice for the
ward” and to “establish the ward’s place of abode within or without this state” (if
consistent with court order). Id. § 26-2A-78(c)(2), (4) (detailing powers held by
minor’s guardian); see also id. § 22-52-51 (conferring upon guardians authority to
make application to have wards admitted for psychiatric observation and diagno-
sis); id. § 22-52-53 (authorizing a guardian to request that his or her ward—who
was voluntarily admitted at some earlier time—be discharged).  Taken together,
these statutes can reasonably be interpreted as conferring authority upon guardi-
ans to consent to the voluntary inpatient treatment of their wards.
186. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(a) (LexisNexis 2014) (providing that
guardians are “responsible for obtaining provision for and making decisions with
respect to the protected person’s support, care, health, habilitation, education,
therapeutic treatment, social interactions with friends and family”).  Section 44A-3-
1 does not specifically address the placement of wards in inpatient care or the
requirement of their consent for medical/mental-health decisions.  The state’s vol-
untary commitment statute, however, does suggest that an individual patient’s con-
sent may be required and that a guardian cannot provide it. See 2013 W. Va. Acts
ch. 128 (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-4-4.
187. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.065(3)(b) (West 2014) (allowing guardian
to “[c]onsent to medical or other professional care, treatment, or advice for the
ward”); see also id. § 387.660(3) (granting guardians authority to “give any neces-
sary consent or approval to enable the ward to receive medical or other profes-
sional care, counsel, treatment or service”).  Particularly relevant in this statute is a
provision directing that a guardian must notify the court within thirty days if the
guardian “places a ward in a licensed residential facility for developmentally dis-
abled persons . . . .” Id. § 387.660(1).  Another provision also provides that individ-
uals with intellectual disabilities may be placed in an Intermediate Care Facility for
Persons with Intellectual Disabilities by their guardians on a voluntary basis. See id.
§ 202B.021.
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voluntary admission for purposes of evaluation only.188  And in California,
special statutory provisions governing wards with severe substance use dis-
orders and others who are “gravely disabled” permit a conservator to pro-
vide consent for voluntary hospitalization,189 but the guardians of persons
with mental illness or other mental disabilities that are chronic but not
persistent are not so authorized.190
Guardians in several other states are permitted to consent to volun-
tary hospitalization if they obtain specific authorization from the probate
court that approved their appointment in the first instance or another
court of appropriate jurisdiction.  States in this category include Kansas191
188. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-312(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2014) (“[A] guardian
may consent or withhold consent that may be necessary to enable the incapaci-
tated person to receive or refuse medical or other professional care, counsel, treat-
ment or service.”).  However, a guardian may only present his or her ward for
evaluation for inpatient mental health treatment. See id. § 43-1-14(B) (“A guardian
appointed under the Uniform Probate Code, an agent or surrogate under the Uni-
form Health-Care Decisions Act or an agent under the Mental Health Care Treat-
ment Decisions Act shall not consent to the admission of an individual to a mental
health care facility.  If a guardian has full power or limited power that includes
medical or mental health treatment or, if the individual’s written advance health-
care directive or advance directive for mental health treatment expressly permits
treatment in a mental health care facility, the guardian, agent or surrogate may
present the person to a facility only for evaluation for admission . . . .”).
189. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6000(a)(1) (West 2014) (authorizing con-
servators to make application for voluntary admission: “[T]he application shall be
made voluntarily by the person . . . or, if he is a conservatee with a conservator . . .
by his conservator.”).  “Any such person received in a state hospital shall be
deemed a voluntary patient.” Id.; see also id. § 5358(a) (“When ordered by the
court after the hearing required by this section, a conservator appointed pursuant
to this chapter shall place his . . . conservatee who is gravely disabled . . . in the
least restrictive alternative placement, as designated by the court. . . .  The place-
ment may include a medical, psychiatric, nursing, or other state-licensed facility, or
a state hospital, county hospital, hospital operated by the Regents of the University
of California, a United States government hospital, or other nonmedical facility
approved by the State Department of Health Care Services or an agency accredited
by the State Department of Health Care Services, or in addition to any of the fore-
going, in cases of chronic alcoholism, to a county alcoholic treatment center.”).
190. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4652 (West 2014).
191. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075 (2014) (conferring upon guardians gen-
eral authority to consent to treatment when necessary).  But, the statute makes
clear that a guardian is not permitted “to place the ward in a treatment facility”
unless the guardian obtains court authorization under the appropriate proce-
dures. See id. § 59-3075(e)(9), see also id. § 59-3077 (outlining requisite proce-
dures, referred to in section 59-3075(e)(9), for guardians to place wards in
treatment facilities).  One such procedural requirement is the provision of a lawyer
for the incapacitated ward. See id. § 59-3077(c)(3).  Kansas’s voluntary commit-
ment statute confirms that a guardian must obtain court approval in order to con-
sent to his or her ward’s placement in a mental health facility: “[I]f such person
has a legal guardian, the legal guardian may make such application [for voluntary
admission] provided that [ ] the legal guardian is [able] to obtain authority to do
so pursuant to [Kan. Stat. Ann. §] 59-3077 . . . then only in accordance with the
provisions thereof.” See id. § 59-29b49; see also In re Guardianship & Conservator-
ship of Royston, 276 P.3d 838 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (confirming need for court
order).
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and Tennessee.192  Relatedly, a guardian in Mississippi may provide con-
sent to inpatient psychiatric care but must first obtain the approval of the
court and the facility director.193
The legal standard (and criteria) governing the decision of a court to
authorize a guardian to give consent to inpatient treatment often is not
specified by statute.  In practice, the standard is likely to be somewhat dif-
ferent from the standard (and associated criteria) governing involuntary
civil commitment decisions in the relevant jurisdiction.194  In Arizona,
however, the criteria for determining judicial approval of a guardian seek-
ing inpatient mental health treatment for a ward are spelled out in some
detail.  Arizona Statute section 14-5312.01 elaborates the ability of a guard-
ian to provide informed consent in the mental health context.  It autho-
rizes a guardian to consent to psychiatric treatment, provided it takes
place outside a “level one” facility (i.e., a psychiatric hospital).195  For
placement in a level one facility, the guardian must obtain a court order
and comply with other notice requirements and procedural provisions.196
Before issuing such an order, the court must find on clear and convincing
evidence that the ward is “incapacitated as a result of a mental disorder . . .
and is likely to be in need of inpatient mental health care and treatment
within the period of the authority granted . . . .”197  Moreover, the court
192. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201 (2014) (listing decision makers who are
eligible to consent to voluntary inpatient hospitalization where individual lacks ca-
pacity).  This includes a conservator, provided the “court has expressly granted
authority to apply for the person’s admission to a hospital or treatment resource
for mental illness or serious emotional disturbance . . . .” Id. § 33-6-201(a)(3).
193. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-103 (2013) (providing that guardians can
make application for voluntary commitment of their wards, provided guardians
obtain court authorization).  In addition, to be admitted, the patient must meet
the facility director’s requirements. See id.  The relevant statutory language is as
follows:
A person with an intellectual disability or with mental illness who is mar-
ried or eighteen (18) years of age or older and who has a legal guardian
or conservator may be admitted to a treatment facility upon application
of his or her legal guardian or conservator if authorization to make the
application has been received from the court having jurisdiction of the
guardianship or conservatorship and the following has occurred:
(a) An investigation by the director that carefully probes the per-
son’s social, psychological and developmental background; and
(b) A determination by the director that the person will benefit from
care and treatment of his or her disorder at the facility and that ser-
vices and facilities are available.  The reasons for the determination
shall be recorded in writing.
Id. § 41-21-103(3).
194. But see Doe v. Doe, 385 N.E.2d 996, 1001 (Mass. 1979).  In Doe, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the “best interests” standard, then
applicable under the statute governing judicial authorization of a guardian to con-
sent to inpatient treatment, required a showing of “likelihood of serious harm,”
the same showing needed for involuntary civil commitment in the state. See id.
195. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312.01 (2012).
196. See id. § 14-5312.01(A).
197. Id. § 14-5312.01(B).
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must consider “the cause of the ward’s disability and the ward’s foresee-
able clinical needs” and must “limit the guardian’s authority to what is
reasonably necessary to obtain the care required for the ward in the least
restrictive treatment alternative.”198  Finally, the court must find that the
evidence is supported by the opinion of a licensed mental health expert
and must “limit the duration of the guardian’s authority to consent to in-
patient mental health care and treatment and include other orders the
court determines necessary to protect the ward’s best interests.”199
Once a guardian in Arizona has received judicial authorization to ar-
range inpatient treatment for the ward, a range of additional notice and
procedural requirements comes into effect.  Within forty-eight hours after
placement, the guardian must give notice to the ward’s attorney.200  If re-
quested by the attorney, the court must then hold a hearing within three
days on the appropriateness of the placement.201  In addition, the treat-
ment facility is directed to “assess the appropriateness of the ward’s place-
ment every thirty days and [to] provide a copy of the assessment report to
the ward’s attorney.”202  Within twenty-four hours after the treatment facil-
ity receives a written request from the ward seeking release, a change in
placement, “or a change in the type or duration of treatment, the facility
[must] forward this information to the ward’s attorney.”203  Finally:
The ward’s guardian shall place the ward in a least restrictive
treatment alternative within five days after the guardian is noti-
fied by the medical director of the inpatient facility that the ward
no longer needs inpatient care.  The ward, a representative of
the inpatient treatment facility, the ward’s attorney, the ward’s
physician or any other interested person may petition the court
to order the facility to discharge the ward to a least restrictive
treatment alternative if the guardian does not act promptly to do
so.204
This highly regulated system by which a guardian is permitted to ob-
tain judicial approval for inpatient mental health treatment of a ward ex-
ists in Arizona alongside an equally restrictive judicial interpretation of the
state’s guardian powers provisions as they relate to voluntary hospital ad-
missions.  In Pima County Public Fiduciary v. Superior Court for Pima
County,205 the Court of Appeals of Arizona was faced with a statute then in
place governing voluntary admissions that contained language that “[i]f
198. Id. § 14-5312.01(C).
199. Id. § 14-5312.01(B), (C).
200. See id. § 14-5312.01(D).
201. See id.; see also id. § 36-536 (entitling all persons facing court-ordered
treatment to appointment of counsel).
202. Id. § 14-5312.01(E).
203. Id. § 14-5312.01(G).
204. Id. § 14-5312.01(I).
205. 546 P.2d 354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
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the person making voluntary application is under guardianship, the appli-
cation shall be signed by the guardian.”206  On the one hand, the court,
relying on prior case law suggesting that an individual under guardianship
should not be prevented from “performing the acts of which he is in fact
capable,”207 indicated that if such a person “is capable of making a deci-
sion to be admitted to a mental health treatment agency,” he or she
should be permitted to do so, provided his or her guardian also signs the
appointment.208  This portion of the opinion is consistent with the statu-
tory language expressly directing the guardian to sign the application for
voluntary admission, although the court suggested that “voluntary” as used
in the statute, “must refer to the voluntary act of the ward and not the
voluntary act of the guardian.”209
On the other hand, in the same opinion, the court went on to explain
that a ward under guardianship is an “incapacitated person,” as defined
under Arizona law, and therefore by definition is “not competent to make
an application for admission to the state hospital and could not make a
voluntary application” under the relevant statute.210  A contrary conclu-
sion, explained the court, would not be consistent with the requirements
of due process and thus would not “pass constitutional muster.”211  The
court distinguished a California statute permitting a conservator to place
his or her conservatee in a hospital, on the grounds that the California
statute required prior judicial approval of the conservator’s authority and
a determination that the conservatee was “gravely disabled.”212  Absent
such a prior judicial finding, explained the Arizona court, the decision of
a guardian to approve inpatient treatment would not constitute an appro-
priate voluntary admission.213  Thus, although the Pima County court’s
analysis is somewhat ambivalent, the best understanding of the court’s po-
sition—and the conclusion most consistent with current statutory require-
ments—is that a guardian seeking inpatient treatment for his or her ward
must obtain judicial approval, provide notice to the ward’s attorney, and
follow the other procedural requirements designed to insure that the ward
will be treated in the least restrictive placement available to meet his or
her needs.
A. Legislative Balancing
The Arizona approach, which permits the hospitalization of an adult
ward on the initiative of a guardian so long as substantive statutory criteria
206. See id. at 356 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-518).
207. Id. at 355 (quoting In re Sherrill’s Estate, 373 P.2d 353, 356 (Ariz. 1962)
(in banc)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 357.
211. Id. at 356.
212. See id. at 357.
213. See id.
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are met and procedural requirements are satisfied, provides a sensible bal-
ance of the competing interests in this area.  On the one hand, by requir-
ing judicial approval of the placement based on clear criteria for decision,
as well as notice to the ward’s counsel, the likelihood that a ward will be
hospitalized unnecessarily over his or her objection is minimized.  On the
other hand, permitting incompetent adults to receive such care if the
court finds that the statutory requirements have been met, even if they are
unable to provide fully informed consent, insures that some individuals
who may not meet the standard for involuntary commitment can still re-
ceive the benefits of inpatient treatment.
A similar balancing of interests is reflected in the approach adopted
in New Hampshire.  Section 464-A:25 of the state code sets out two alterna-
tive paths by which a guardian can arrange for inpatient care for a ward.
Following the first path, a guardian “may admit a ward to a state institution
with prior approval of the probate court if, following notice and hearing,
the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the placement is in the
ward’s best interest and is the least restrictive placement available.”214
The second path permits the guardian to arrange an inpatient placement
without prior court approval, but seeks to safeguard the ward’s autonomy,
self-determination, and liberty interests by imposing a rigorous set of pro-
cedural protections to insure that the arrangement is monitored going
forward.  A guardian following the second path must obtain the written
certification of a physician or psychiatrist and must submit written notice,
with reasons for the placement, to the probate court within thirty-six hours
of the inpatient admission.215  The probate court is obligated under the
statute to evaluate the sufficiency of the notice by determining whether
the admission is in the ward’s best interest and is the least restrictive place-
ment available.  The court then must appoint counsel for the ward and
must notify the ward of that appointment.216  Counsel is given a limited
period in which to file a report and request a hearing.217  If a hearing is
scheduled, it is the guardian’s burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the inpatient admission is in the ward’s best interest and is the least
restrictive placement available.218  Finally, the statute sets presumptive
time limits on the inpatient hospitalization (no more than sixty days for
any single admission and no more than ninety days in any twelve-month
period), beyond which court approval is required, and authorizes the ward
214. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2014).
215. See id. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(2); see also In re Guardianship of R.A., 920 A.2d
1213 (N.H. 2007) (providing example of guardian employing second path for vol-
untarily arranging inpatient placement for ward).
216. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(3).
217. See id. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(4) (giving counsel five days from date of appoint-
ment to file report and request hearing).
218. See id. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(5).
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or the ward’s counsel to request a hearing “at any time” during the
placement.219
In Oregon, guardians also are permitted to arrange inpatient mental
health treatment without prior court approval, although they are required
to provide notice to the court and to interested parties who may then re-
quest a court hearing.  While Oregon’s guardian powers statute generally
authorizes a guardian to “consent, refuse consent or withhold or withdraw
consent to health care . . . for the protected person,” the statute makes
clear that this power is subject to the State’s Health Care Decisions Act
governing other health care agents.220  In addition, the law sets out fur-
ther limitations on a guardian’s authority with respect to inpatient admis-
sions.  It provides that “[b]efore a guardian may place an adult protected
person in a mental health treatment facility, a nursing home or other resi-
dential facility, the guardian must file a statement with the court inform-
ing the court that the guardian intends to make the placement.”221  The
statute also imposes other procedural requirements, including the provi-
sion of notice to an enumerated list of interested persons with instructions
on how they may object.222  Once these notice requirements are met,
“[t]he guardian may thereafter place the adult protected person in a
219. See id. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(6), (7).
220. See OR. REV. STAT. § 125.315 (2013).
221. Id. § 125.320(3)(a).
222. See id. § 125.320(3).  Section 125.320(3) provides:
Before a guardian may place an adult protected person in a mental
health treatment facility, a nursing home or other residential facility, the
guardian must file a statement with the court informing the court that
the guardian intends to make the placement. . . .
(b) Notice of the statement of intent must be given in the manner
provided by [OR. REV. STAT. §] 125.065 to the persons specified in
[OR. REV. STAT. §] 125.060(3).
(c) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (b) of this subsec-
tion, notice of the statement of intent must be given in the manner
provided by [OR. REV. STAT. §] 125.065 by the guardian to the follow-
ing persons:
(A) Any attorney who represented the protected person at any
time during the protective proceeding.
(B) If the protected person is a resident of a nursing home or
residential facility, or if the notice states the intention to place
the protected person in a nursing home or residential facility,
the office of the Long Term Care Ombudsman.
(C) If the protected person is a resident of a mental health treat-
ment facility or a residential facility for individuals with develop-
mental disabilities, or if the notice states the intention to place
the protected person in such a facility, the system described in
[OR. REV. STAT. §] 192.517 (1).
(d) In addition to the requirements of [OR. REV. STAT. §] 125.070
(1), the notice given to the protected person must clearly indicate
the manner in which the protected person may object to the pro-
posed placement.
(e) The guardian may thereafter place the adult protected person in
a mental health treatment facility, a nursing home or other residen-
tial facility without further court order.  If an objection is made in the
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mental health treatment facility, a nursing home or other residential facil-
ity without further court order.”223
In Minnesota, the Uniform Probate Code, as adopted, charges guardi-
ans with the duty to consent to “necessary medical or other professional
care, counsel, treatment, or service . . . [other than] psychosurgery, elec-
troshock, sterilization, or experimental treatment of any kind” that a ward
may require.224  The statue further provides, however, that a ward “may
not be admitted to a regional treatment center” (i.e., a state mental health
treatment facility) by the guardian except following a hearing under the
state’s involuntary civil commitment law or for outpatient services.225  In
the mid-1990s, a Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force was charged with
considering how to manage persons who, though incompetent to provide
informed consent, were “not resisting the proposed [inpatient] treat-
ment.”226  The Task Force recommended that “a new option, other than
Civil Commitment, should be available for persons who are in need of
mental health treatment, not resisting treatment, but [who] are incompe-
tent to give informed consent to treatment or admission.”227  Specifically,
the Task Force proposed, and the state legislature adopted, a system by
which substitute consent can be provided, in the first instance by an indi-
vidual designated as a health care power of attorney through an advance
directive, or in the alternative by the local county mental health authority
or its designee.228  By further statutory amendment in 2001, the state legis-
lature authorized courts to appoint a different “substitute decision maker”
if no health care power of attorney has been named and if the designated
local agency is unable or unwilling to provide consent.229  Presumably,
under this provision, a guardian may receive court appointment as a “sub-
manner provided by [OR. REV. STAT. §] 125.075, the court shall
schedule a hearing on the objection as soon as practicable.
(f) The requirement that notice be served on an attorney for a pro-
tected person under paragraph (c)(A) of this subsection does not
impose any responsibility on the attorney receiving the notice to re-
present the protected person in the protective proceeding.
Id.
223. Id. § 125.320(3)(e).
224. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) (West 2014).
225. See id. § 524.5-313(c)(1).
226. See Halverson, supra note 4, at 177 (discussing and citing MINN. SUP. CT.
RESEARCH & PLANNING OFFICE, STATE COURT ADMIN., ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE
CIVIL COMMITMENT SYSTEM 35 (1996) [hereinafter MINN. CIVIL COMMITMENT TASK
FORCE], available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/administra
tion/AdministrationFiles/Civil%20Commitment%20Task%20Force%20ADM10-
8046%20(formerly%20C4-94-1646)/1996-01-17%20Civil%20Commitment%20
Task%20Force%20Rpt.pdf).
227. Id. (quoting MINN. CIVIL COMMITMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 226, at 35)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
228. See id.; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.04, subd. 1a.
229. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.04, subd. 1b.
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stitute decision maker” and thereby obtain the authority to consent to in-
patient treatment for his or her ward.230
Neither the voluntary admissions statute nor the special provision gov-
erning substitute decision making sets out the duties of the entity—county
agency, family member, or guardian—designated as the substitute deci-
sion maker.231  The statute does, however, provide criteria for determin-
ing whether such authority should be conferred by the court, as well as
procedures for overseeing the ward’s inpatient admission.  Thus, in cases
where no health care power of attorney has been named in an advanced
directive and in which the local mental health agency or its designee has
not provided consent, “the person who is seeking treatment or admission,
or an interested person acting on behalf of the person, may petition the
court for appointment of a substitute decision maker who may give in-
formed consent for voluntary treatment and services.”232  In evaluating
such a petition, the court is directed to consider two criteria: first, whether
“the person demonstrates an awareness of the person’s illness, and the
reasons for treatment, its risks, benefits and alternatives, and the possible
consequences of refusing treatment;” and second, “whether the person
communicates verbally or nonverbally a clear choice concerning treat-
ment that is a reasoned one, not based on delusion, even though it may
not be in the person’s best interests.”233  Once the authority of a substitute
decision maker to approve an inpatient admission is granted, “the person
[the ward in the case of a guardian] or any interested person acting on the
person’s behalf may seek court review within five days for a determination
of whether the person’s agreement to accept treatment or admission is
voluntary.”234  Moreover, the statute requires that the patient be informed
in writing that he or she may leave the facility within twelve hours of mak-
ing such a request.235
230. The Minnesota Voluntary admissions statute clearly contemplates that a
guardian may receive court authorization to provide substitute consent for volun-
tary admission. See id. § 253B.04, subd. 1(c)(2) (“Legally valid substitute consent
may be provided by a . . . guardian or conservator with authority to consent to
mental health treatment . . . .”).
231. See Halverson, supra note 4, at 183–84.
232. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.04, subd. 1b.
233. Id. § 253.04, subd. 1a(b)(1)–(2).  These are the same criteria for deci-
sion that the statute sets out to guide the decision of the designated local mental
health agency. See id.; see also id. § 253.04, subd. 1b (noting same criteria should be
used to evaluate petition for a substitute decision maker as laid out for evaluating
designated mental health agencies in subdivision 1a(b)).
234. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a(e).  This statutory right to seek judicial review of
the voluntariness of a patient’s agreement to an inpatient placement applies both
to admissions approved by a substitute decision maker and to admissions in which
the patient himself or herself provided consent. See id.
235. See id. § 253B.04, subd. 2.  Under this same section, an individual receiv-
ing inpatient treatment for chemical dependency is entitled to release within sev-
enty-two hours of making such a request. See id.
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B. Managing the Tension Between Incompetency and Partial Capacity
The ambivalence exhibited by the Arizona appellate court in Pima
County, with respect to whether an adult under guardianship might possess
sufficient agency to make a voluntary decision to enter inpatient treat-
ment, is instructive.  If it were to turn out that some wards are capable of
participating in this sort of decision making—either by providing actual
consent or by communicating agreement with a guardian’s decision short
of fully informed consent—then perhaps the reluctance of many jurisdic-
tions to permit the voluntary hospitalization of adults under guardianship
might be ameliorated.  Some writers take the position that all wards admit-
ted for inpatient treatment by a guardian should be regarded as entering
involuntarily, presumably because the very fact of their being under guard-
ianship requires a judicial finding that the ward is incompetent.236  Ulti-
mately, the Arizona court in Pima County seemed to settle on this position
when it concluded that the decision of the guardian to approve inpatient
treatment could not constitutionally be permitted under the state’s volun-
tary admissions statute, because the ward’s prior adjudication as an “inca-
pacitated person” necessarily constituted a judicial finding that he lacked
“sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning his person.”237  Earlier in the opinion, however, the
Pima County court appeared to recognize that a finding of legal incompe-
tence, even if based on expert evidence of the ward’s impaired decision-
making ability, need not be treated the same as a determination that the
individual entirely lacked “clinical (de facto) competence or decision-mak-
ing ability.”238  According to this understanding, even a ward with a judi-
cially appointed guardian should not be prevented from “performing the
acts of which he is in fact capable.”239  Moreover, said the court, if such an
individual were to agree to inpatient treatment, that agreement would be
“the voluntary act of the ward and not the voluntary act of the
guardian.”240
In order to make some sense of this tension between the categorical
legal determination of incompetency often associated with the appoint-
ment of a general guardian and the partial functional understanding of
capacity or incapacity more often employed by clinicians in practice, some
236. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 179.  For purposes of this discussion, I
am assuming a general guardianship.  Many states have adopted statutory prefer-
ences for limited guardianships, when appropriate, but some observers have re-
ported that this “least restrictive alternative” approach is underutilized even in
those jurisdictions that formally appear to require it. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER,
supra note 3, at 948.
237. See Pima Cnty. Pub. Fiduciary v. Superior Court for Pima Cnty., 546 P.2d
354, 357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5101(1)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
238. See WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 96, at 116.
239. See Pima Cnty., 546 P.2d at 355 (quoting In re Sherrill’s Estate, 373 P.2d
353, 356 (Ariz. 1962) (in banc)).
240. See id.
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attention should be directed to the various legal tests that courts use in
making guardianship determinations.241  One long-standing approach fo-
cuses on whether the individual is capable of making decisions that pro-
duce reasonable outcomes.  State statutes that reflect this approach
typically require a showing that the person is not capable of caring for
himself or herself, or providing for his or her family, in order for a guard-
ian to be appointed.242  A second approach, now followed in many states,
was developed as part of the UPC.  This approach shifts the court’s focus
from reasonable outcomes to the regularity of the individual’s decision-
making process itself.243  Under the UPC approach, a person with mental
disabilities may be adjudged incompetent if shown to be impaired in the
ability to engage in the cognitive process of rationally weighing the risks
and benefits of competing choices.244  It was this standard, ultimately, that
the Pima County court relied on in determining that an adult under guard-
ianship in Arizona could not voluntarily elect inpatient treatment.245
The UPC process-based approach has been criticized for the subjec-
tive judgment it requires courts to make in determining whether an indi-
vidual’s thought processes are “rational” and for its consequent
susceptibility to abuse.246  In response to this critique, in recent years,
some states have developed yet a third approach, which shifts the focus
away from process and back toward a consideration of outcomes.  Unlike
the reasonable outcomes approach, however, this new “functional ap-
proach” directs the court’s analysis to specific decision-making tasks that
an individual might be called upon to undertake with respect to housing,
health care, and the like, and requires the individual’s dysfunction to be
demonstrated through specific evidence indicating imminent risk.247
Clearly, the decision of a court to find an individual legally incompe-
tent and in need of a guardian can carry a range of different meanings,
depending upon which of these measures of incompetency the court has
employed.  Thus, an adult adjudicated incompetent under the functional
approach because he or she suffers from a delusion specific to one impor-
tant choice—say the decision whether to undergo treatment with psycho-
tropic medications—but whose mental processes are otherwise not
globally impaired, stands in a very different position than does another
individual found by a court to be incompetent under the UPC approach
because he or she is broadly impaired in his or her capacity to engage in a
practical reasoning process.  More to the point, the assumption that an
individual under guardianship is categorically incapable of usefully con-
241. See generally Phillip Tor, Note, Finding Incompetency in Guardianship: Stan-
dardizing the Process, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 739 (1993).
242. See id. at 743; see also BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 371.
243. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 5 (2010).
244. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 946.
245. See Pima Cnty., 546 P.2d at 357.
246. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 946–47.
247. See id. at 946 (discussing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:2).
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tributing to his or her guardian’s decision making with respect to inpa-
tient treatment fails to take seriously the various distinct competencies that
may (or may not) be impacted by even severe mental illness or other sig-
nificant mental disabilities, as well as the different degrees of relevance
that each of these competencies holds to such a decision.248
The substantive standards adopted in Arizona, New Hampshire, and
Minnesota for judicial authorization or review of a guardian’s decision to
arrange inpatient treatment, together with the notice and other procedu-
ral requirements reflected in these states’ laws, provide useful tools for
evaluating and supervising this work.249  In reviewing these statutes, cer-
tain basic policy choices stand out.  First, should judicial authorization be
required in advance of any decision to place an adult under guardianship
in an inpatient mental health setting, or is some combination of the pa-
tient himself or herself, the guardian, and involved mental health profes-
sionals a sufficient team for making the initial determination?  Second,
regardless of whether the determination is made by clinicians or by judi-
cial actors, what level (or kind) of functional competency should be re-
quired of a patient who either seeks to provide consent or at least to assent
to a guardian’s decision to elect inpatient treatment?250  And third, how
should the law deal with adults under guardianship who withhold consent
or perhaps even communicate a desire not to be admitted to an inpatient
setting?
With respect to the first question, many of the same concerns identi-
fied by those who challenge the general preference for voluntary inpatient
admission over involuntary commitment are relevant to an approach that
permits guardians to elect inpatient treatment for their wards without a
prior judicial hearing.  Thus, worries over the potential for abuse, coer-
cion, and the lack of an adversary process are all present in a system that
permits guardians to provide consent without first being required to
demonstrate through a judicial proceeding that such a placement is in the
ward’s interest and is necessary for his or her well-being.251  On the other
side, some argue that a requirement that the guardian obtain formal judi-
cial approval in advance would be costly and unnecessary, particularly in
jurisdictions in which the guardian’s judgment as to the necessity and util-
ity of inpatient treatment must be supported by one or more mental
health professionals, often through the submission of a written assessment
to that effect.252  In addition, it is argued, a guardian has “already been
248. See Roca, supra note 2, at 1191.
249. See supra notes 195–219, 224–35 and accompanying text.
250. On the distinction between “assent” and “consent” to admission or treat-
ment, see Stone, supra note 4, at 32 (explaining that assent “requires acquiescence,
a tacit acceptance, or non-response such as silence,” while consent “requires a
competent patient’s active and voluntary acceptance of a prescribed course of
treatment”).
251. See Halverson, supra note 4, at 166; Stone, supra note 4, at 33.
252. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2014).
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appointed by a court [as] an appropriate person to provide informed con-
sent,” and thus should not be obliged to obtain “additional judicial review”
for the hospitalization decision.253  Finally, advocates for this position
point out that the costs associated with delaying the provision of treatment
are likely to outweigh the benefits of preventing what is likely to be a low
potential for abuse.254
In light of these competing considerations, Donald Stone has con-
cluded that a “middle ground” may well suffice to guard against the dan-
gers of coercion or abuse he perceives as “common in psychiatric
hospitals[’]” inpatient admissions practices.255  This middle ground does
not mandate a prior judicial hearing, but it does require that the individ-
ual be provided counsel as a condition for being voluntarily admitted.
Under Stone’s proposal, which would apply to all voluntary admissions
and not just those approved by a guardian, the attorney would have an
obligation to interview the individual and to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion.  If, after this interview and investigation, the attorney were to con-
clude that his or her client “is capable of knowingly and voluntarily
admitting himself [or herself] into the hospital, the patient should be per-
mitted to exercise this option without judicial review.”256
Critics of Stone’s middle ground approach point out that attorneys
“typically lack prior knowledge of the patient or the patient’s social or
medical history,” and moreover that “a competency determination is
hardly something that is within an attorney’s professional knowledge.”257
These concerns may or may not be accurate, depending in part on
whether the jurisdiction maintains a cadre of specialized attorneys with
subject matter expertise and, at least for chronic patients, some prior rela-
tionship with their clients.  In any event, the essential advantages of
Stone’s proposal might be realized through a state law process something
like that in place in New Hampshire and Oregon.  Recall that in New
Hampshire, a guardian is permitted to arrange an inpatient placement
without prior court approval, but the guardian must obtain the written
certification of a physician or psychiatrist and must submit written notice,
with reasons for the placement, to the probate court within thirty-six hours
of the inpatient admission.258  This permits a guardian to arrange inpa-
tient care without delay, but sets into motion a legal process that reduces
the potential for abuse.  The New Hampshire approach imposes some su-
pervisory duties on the probate court, which must review the guardian’s
filing in order to determine whether the admission is in the ward’s best
interest and is the least restrictive placement available.  As with Stone’s
253. Halverson, supra note 4, at 167.
254. See id.
255. Stone, supra note 4, at 34.
256. Id. at 34–35.
257. Halverson, supra note 4, at 167.
258. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2014); see also
In re Guardianship of R.A., 920 A.2d 1213 (N.H. 2007).
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approach, counsel must be appointed for the ward.259  Within a relatively
short window of time, the lawyer must then interview the client and con-
duct an investigation, leading to the filing of a report and a possible hear-
ing.  If such a hearing is scheduled, the court must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the inpatient admission is in the ward’s best interest
and is the least restrictive available.260
On balance, this sort of hybrid approach, which permits the guardian
to approve inpatient hospitalization but also triggers a judicial review pro-
cess along with attorney consultation and investigation, appears to strike a
sensible balance between the concerns present in this area.  Even if such a
system were put in place, however, a further question arises as to the kind
of functional competency that should be required of a patient whose
guardian has arranged inpatient treatment.  Some jurisdictions, of course,
require informed consent before a voluntary placement is permitted, even
for individuals under guardianship.261  Stone defines such consent as re-
quiring “a competent patient’s active and voluntary acceptance of a pre-
scribed course of treatment following . . . full disclosure of associated risks
and benefits . . . .”262  At the other extreme, some argue that mere “assent
to retention by the facility” should suffice, in which case “acquiescence, a
tacit acceptance, or non-response such as silence” could be a sufficient
basis for permitting the inpatient admission.263  The best approach is one
in which some reasonable assessment of the functional capacity of the
ward to contribute to the decision-making process is used to determine
the level of involvement required to permit the guardian to arrange an
inpatient admission.  Such a sliding scale of competency could be imple-
mented as a way of operationalizing a best interests standard for approval
of the guardian’s decision.264
As noted above, in Arizona, the substantive criteria governing the de-
cision of a court to authorize a guardian to approve inpatient treatment
include whether the ward is “incapacitated as a result of a mental disor-
der . . . and is likely to be in need of inpatient mental health care and
treatment within the period of the authority granted,” as well as “the cause
259. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(3).
260. See id. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(4), (5).
261. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-400 (West 2014) (setting out con-
sent requirement for voluntary admission in Illinois Mental Health and Develop-
mental Disabilities Code); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.17 (McKinney 2014)
(governing requirement of informed consent); see also In re Gardner, 459 N.E.2d
17, 20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that individuals who lack capacity to provide
informed consent for inpatient treatment cannot be admitted by their guardians).
262. Stone, supra note 4, at 32.
263. See id.
264. See Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/
Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 739, 750–51 (2012) (setting out “Substituted Judgment-Best Interest Con-
tinuum Model” for guardian decision making).
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of the ward’s disability and the ward’s foreseeable clinical needs.”265
While these criteria are appropriate considerations for purposes of moni-
toring the decision of the guardian to elect inpatient hospitalization, they
do not provide a basis for assessing whether the ward has contributed suffi-
ciently to this decision in light of his or her actual ability to do so.  Impor-
tantly, however, the Arizona statute also requires the court to “limit the
duration of the guardian’s authority to consent to inpatient mental health
care and treatment and include other orders the court determines neces-
sary to protect the ward’s best interests.”266  This additional provision, cen-
tered on a best interests analysis, does begin to offer some basis for
evaluating the capacity of the adult under guardianship to play a role in
the decision-making process.  Similarly, in New Hampshire, if a judicial
hearing is held, it is the guardian’s burden to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the inpatient admission is in the ward’s best interest and is the
least restrictive available.267
A best interests requirement can be understood as: (1) an injunction
to the decision maker to select a course of action based upon his or her
own judgment of the best outcome for the subject, all things considered;
(2) a requirement that the decision maker base the choice on an assess-
ment of what the subject would want if he or she were able to make a
competent decision; or (3) a requirement that the decision maker develop
a choice that is consistent with the long-term values and commitments of
the subject as revealed or expressed through conduct or prior state-
ments.268  In the Doe case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court con-
strued the state’s then-existing statutory best interests requirement to
contain an additional related feature, which is of particular assistance in
thinking about the question of the ward’s capacity to participate in the
decision-making process itself.  The court explained that, in cases in which
the ward is capable of formulating or expressing a preference, the ward’s
“stated preference” with respect to the proposed inpatient admission
“must be treated as a critical factor in the determination of his ‘best inter-
ests.’”269  Moreover, explained the court, this reading of the role that the
ward’s expressed preferences should play in evaluating his best interests
should apply notwithstanding the fact that the ward “failed to understand
his mental condition and his need for treatment . . . .”270
Returning to the four domains of competency identified by Appel-
baum and Roth,271 we can now begin to construct a matrix for guiding the
265. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312.01(B), (C) (2012).
266. See id. § 14-5312.01(C).
267. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(I)(a)(4)–(5) (LexisNexis 2014).
268. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 226; see also Frolik & Whitton,
supra note 264, at 751–52.
269. See Doe v. Doe, 385 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (Mass. 1979).
270. See id.
271. For a discussion of the Appelbaum and Roth criteria, see supra notes
114–39 and accompanying text.
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evaluation of the best interests of an adult under guardianship in light of
his or her functional capacity to contribute to a decision to seek inpatient
treatment.  The first, most basic competency is the capacity to evidence a
choice.  While the number of adults under guardianship who are entirely
unable to communicate their agreement or disagreement is likely to be
small, such individuals do present from time to time.272  Clearly, these
wards are not capable of contributing in any fashion to the decision to
seek inpatient treatment.  For those who do not meet the statutory stan-
dard for involuntary commitment because there is insufficient evidence of
danger to others or to themselves, these individuals will be foreclosed
from obtaining the advantages of inpatient care if their guardians are not
permitted to provide consent on their behalf.273  While some argue that
these individuals should receive care in the community as outpatients if
they are not civilly committable, the reality in most localities is that ade-
quate outpatient services often are unavailable or nonexistent.274  The po-
sition of the Massachusetts court in Doe with respect to such individuals is
that a doctrine of substituted judgment may be appropriate.275  Of course,
the basis for a substituted judgment can be relatively “objective” and based
on the guardian’s own views about the costs and benefits of inpatient ad-
mission, or more closely tailored to the choice that the ward would have
made were he or she able to do so.276  A properly devised statutory scheme
in which the guardian’s judgment is subject to subsequent judicial scrutiny
according to sensible substantive criteria—like those articulated in the Ari-
zona statute—together with a rigorous requirement that the ward be
placed in the least restrictive setting appropriate to his or her needs,277 is
likely to be the most effective system for insuring that a process of substi-
tute judgment is implemented appropriately.278
A far greater number of adults under guardianship are likely to have
the ability to evidence a choice and some further functional capacity
within the second category of competency described by Appelbaum and
Roth.279  These individuals may possess the cognitive capacity to under-
stand the basic facts of their condition and of the proposed institutional
placement, but may not be able entirely to comprehend the full import of
those facts or the consequences of the choice that is being made by the
guardian on their behalf to approve inpatient treatment.  Whether these
272. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 952–56.
273. See Stone, supra note 4, at 37.
274. See SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 3, at 706–07.
275. See Doe, 385 N.E.2d at 1000.
276. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 226.
277. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312.01(B), (C) (2012).
278. As noted in the text, some writers take the not unreasonable position
that patients who are incompetent in this sense should be admitted only as invol-
untary patients.  Given the competing interests at stake, however, I have concluded
that a system of judicially supervised voluntary admissions is the preferable
approach.
279. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 952–56.
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individuals’ cognitive capabilities are limited to a basic understanding of
essential information or extend to an “actual understanding” of those facts
and their likely consequences,280 their expressed preferences should be
accorded some weight in the evaluation of their best interests.  The more
cognitive facility they demonstrate, the greater deference a reviewing
court should accord their views.  Thus, a guardian who is acting consistent
with the articulated preferences of a ward with some cognitive purchase on
the circumstances of the decision should be more likely to receive court
approval than a guardian whose ward has been unable to engage even in
that minimal level of participation in the decision-making process.  This
should be the case even in many instances in which the ward’s thinking
includes some distorted or false beliefs, although the more centrally those
false ideas implicate the very decision to be made, the more problematic
they will be as counting in favor of the decision being approved by the
court.
The next category of functional capacities identified by Appelbaum
and Roth relates closely to the UPC’s approach to defining the line be-
tween competency and incompetency.281  This third category goes to the
individual’s ability to undertake a “rational” process of deliberation.  In
the context of a decision to approve inpatient treatment, this sort of ra-
tional deliberation would include consideration of the relative advantages
and disadvantages of inpatient care and of reasonably available alterna-
tives.282  As noted earlier, an assessment of rationality may be difficult if
the ward assigns values to the competing costs and benefits that are wildly
divergent from those identified by others evaluating his or her compe-
tency.283  Here again, if the ward holds false beliefs that are directly rele-
vant to his or her calculation of the competing options, the weight a
reviewing court should accord his or her conclusions ought to be reduced
accordingly.  Nevertheless, an individual who demonstrates a basic ability
to assess relevant information in order to generate a preference that re-
flects his or her essential values ought to be treated as a significant partner
in the decision-making process, and, if that preference is consistent with
the judgment of the guardian, it ought to shore up considerably the claim
of the guardian to be acting in the ward’s best interests.
The final area of competency identified by Appelbaum and Roth is
the ability to “appreciate[e] the nature of the situation.”284  This capac-
ity—to apply information to new circumstances in order to formulate a
plan of action or a solution to a problem and to engage that process of
application in both the affective and cognitive domains—is the most de-
280. See id.
281. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 5 (2010).
282. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 954.
283. For a discussion of the differences between the process-based and out-
comes-centered approaches to competency, see supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
284. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 114, at 954–56.
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manding of the measures of competency in Appelbaum and Roth’s typog-
raphy of functional abilities.  It is not inconceivable that an individual with
mental illness or other mental disability may have this capacity, even
though he or she may also harbor distorted or false beliefs.  While the
presence of false beliefs may diminish somewhat the weight given to his or
her judgment, the fact that an individual is able to appreciate in this rich
sense the circumstances surrounding his or her hospitalization should
count heavily in the court’s assessment.  If an adult under guardianship
possessed of this sort of appreciation of his or her situation expresses a
preference that is in accord with the judgment of the guardian, the claim
that the consent is voluntary is substantially strengthened.
Of course, a ward may also express either clear or implied opposition
to a guardian’s plan to arrange inpatient care.  In such cases, the tension
between the judgment of the guardian and the wishes of the ward creates
real problems in terms of the coherence of treating such an admission as
voluntary.  One could take the position that anything short of affirmative
consent, or at least passive assent, renders the guardian’s choice in favor of
inpatient treatment involuntary and therefore necessarily implicates the
civil commitment standards and procedures that govern all involuntary in-
patient commitments.285  The problem with this move, as noted earlier, is
that it may make it impossible to provide inpatient treatment to a non-
cooperating ward whose mental illness or other disability does not create a
sufficient danger to self or others to satisfy the involuntary commitment
standard.286  In the best of all worlds, this gap would be closed through
the provision of clinically appropriate outpatient services.  In most jurisdic-
tions, however, the network of community-based mental health resources
is less than fully adequate to meet this need.  Arguably, a jurisdiction’s
failure to provide a complete continuum of outpatient care should not
drive the development of a distorted doctrinal approach to voluntary ad-
missions.  At least for adults under guardianship who are capable of ex-
pressing a preference and who indicate that they oppose an inpatient
placement, therefore, important interests in patient autonomy and self-
determination ought to counsel in favor of defaulting to the rigorous re-
quirements of the involuntary civil commitment regime.
V. CONCLUSION
The conventional view is that there are two methods by which a
guardian, family member, or other proxy decision maker might make a
judgment on behalf of an impaired individual.287  First, the proxy decision
maker could reach a decision based on the best interests of the ward.  Or-
dinarily, this approach is characterized as “neutral or objective” because it
is not based on the ward’s particular viewpoint regarding the matter for
285. See, e.g., In re Gardner, 459 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
286. See Stone, supra note 4, at 37.
287. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 1, at 226–27.
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decision.288  In truth, however, a best interests assessment is still a judg-
ment resting on a particular perspective, precisely because it involves the
proxy decision maker acting on the basis of his or her own best judgment
as to the ward’s well-being.289  The alternative approach is more frankly
subjective, in that it requires the proxy decision maker to determine what
the ward would have wanted in the situation had he or she been able to
decide for himself or herself.290
For adults under guardianship facing the prospect of an inpatient ad-
mission, a better approach than either of these conventional alternatives
standing alone is to integrate these formally distinct ways of thinking
about proxy decision making, so that the best interests of the ward are
construed to include a consideration of the ward’s likely preferences as
well as a more objective determination of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the proposed inpatient placement.  Taken in this fashion, a best
interests determination would subsume an assessment of clinical factors
with respect to the ward’s amenability to treatment, suitability for alterna-
tive outpatient care, and the like, as well as a consideration of the ward’s
preferences expressed at the moment or in the past.
Statutes governing the “voluntary” admission of adults under guardi-
anship should be revised to require that proxy decision makers and review-
ing courts employ this modified conception of best interests.  They should
also contain procedural requirements that, while acknowledging the
guardian’s authority to make an initial determination, insure effective sub-
sequent judicial supervision of the inpatient placement, in order to guar-
antee that the ward’s needs are met in the least restrictive setting
appropriate and in a fashion that is most consistent with the ward’s capac-
ity for self-determination.
288. See WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 96, at 290.
289. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 129, at 563.
290. See WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 96, at 291.
